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ARTICLE

Probable Cause Revisited
William Ortman"
Abstract. Most judges, lawyers, and scholars take it for granted that to charge a criminal
defendant, the government needs only probable cause of guilt. But in fact, probable cause
represents a choice, not a fixed element of our legal tradition.
This Article begins with the history of the probable cause standard. It presents novel
evidence that many Founding-era American judges rejected the idea, urged by a group of
English lawyers and judges a century earlier, that criminal charges require only a
"probable ground for accusation." Many insisted that grand jurors should be certain of a
suspect's guilt before returning an indictment, a charging standard that was well suited to
the Founding generation's anxiety about concentrations of power and their informal
criminal trials. Probable cause gained traction as a charging standard in the United States
in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when the criminal trial gained the
appearance of reliability. Grand juries and magistrates no longer needed to be certain of a
suspect's guilt because a trial jury would be. Or so it must have seemed at the time.
The puzzle is that the probable cause standard survived even after the rise of plea
bargaining exploded this logic. This Article offers three explanations for probable cause's
survival as a charging standard. First, policymakers may not have valued certainty of guilt,
or, for that matter, constraint on prosecution, as much as they once did. Second,
"voluntary" guilty pleas may have provided-or appearedto provide-adequate certainty of
guilt. Third, policymakers may have failed to examine the fit between plea bargaining and
probable cause, making probable cause's survival a matter of unreflective path dependence.
But while these explanations are descriptively plausible, they are also normatively
troubling. Worse, the probable cause standard exacerbates plea bargaining's innocence
problem and its propensity for prosecutorial control of criminal justice. The time has
come to revisit it.

" Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School. Many thanks to Albert
Alschuler, Douglas Baird, Rachel Barkow, Jason Bates, Stephanos Bibas, Josh Bowers,
Andrew Crespo, Daniel Epps, Daniel Farbman, Joseph Fishman, Janet Halley, Elizabeth
Papp Kamali, Michael Klarman, Stanton Krauss, Benjamin Levin, Leah Litman,
Susannah Tobin, Simon Stern, David Sklansky, Matthew Wansley, and the editors of
the Stanford Law Review for helpful comments.
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Introduction
Most judges, lawyers, and scholars accept uncritically that to charge a

criminal defendant, the government must present probable cause of his guilt to
a grand jury or magistrate. The Supreme Court, for instance, treats the
probable cause'standard for federal criminal charges, like the reasonable doubt

standard for convictions, as ancient and inevitable. 1 It is not. In reality,
probable cause is just one of many criminal charging standards known in
theory and history.
Charging standards are essential elements of criminal justice systems, yet
the criminal procedure literature has paid surprisingly little attention to

them.2 By contrast, civil procedure scholarship focuses extensively on the
analogous feature of civil litigation: pleading standards. Since the Supreme
Court revised the civil pleading requirements in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,3

scholars have carefully examined the relationship between pleading regimes
4
and other aspects of civil litigation, especially discovery and settlement. Civil
pleading rules and criminal charging standards serve a similar function-they
determine which cases will be allowed into court. No less than their civil
procedure colleagues, criminal procedure scholars should be attentive to the
"fit" between a charging standard and the broader adjudicative system to which
it belongs.

Part I of this Article begins that effort by offering a simple framework for
understanding the relationship between criminal charging standards and
adjudicative systems. I argue that charging standards have two primary effects
on criminal justice systems: they inhibit erroneous convictions and they
1. See, e.g., Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1097-98 (2014) ("This Court has often
recognized the grand jury's singular role in finding the probable cause necessary to
initiate a prosecution for a serious crime."). The Court has also suggested that states-to
which the Fifth Amendment's Grand Jury Clause does not apply-might be able to
initiate prosecution without any charging standard at all. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 125 n.26 (1975) ("[T]he probable cause determination is not a constitutional
prerequisite to the charging decision .... "); see also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 283
(1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he due process requirements for
criminal proceedings do not include a standard for the initiation of a criminal
prosecution.").
2. The most substantial treatments are BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, "BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT"
AND "PROBABLE CAUSE": HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF

EVIDENCE 42-113 (1991); and Peter Arenella, Reforming the Federal GrandJury and the
State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REV.
463, 478-79 (1980).
3. 550 U.S. 544, 548-49 (2007).
4. See, e.g., Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1300
(2010) ("[Tjhe relationship between pleading standards and discovery costs ... drives
so much of the contemporary debate."); William H.J. Hubbard, A Fresh Look at
Plausibility Pleading (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 663,
2015), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/lawandeconomics/743 (focusing on the
relationship between pleading and settlement).
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constrain the delegation of prosecutorial authority. Strict charging standards
are attractive to criminal justice policymakers for whom certainty of guilt and
prosecutorial constraint are important. And they are especially appealing when
certainty and constraint are not otherwise provided for in the adjudicative
system.

Part II uses this framework to explore the history of charging standards in
the United States from the Founding to the twentieth century, when "probable
cause" came to dominate in the federal courts and the majority of the states.
Important parts of this history have not before been told. The history
demonstrates that, contrary to commonly held intuitions, probable cause is
neither inevitable nor ancient, but instead contingent and of fairly recent
vintage.
Part II.A presents novel evidence that many judges of the Founding era
rejected the idea, urged by a group of English lawyers and judges a century
earlier, that criminal charges require only a "probable Ground for an
Accusation."5 Several Founding-era judges told grand juries that they could
indict only if they were certain of a suspect's guilt. Part Il.A draws on-but

complicates-the leading historical study of criminal charging standards,
which found that there was no commonly accepted approach during the

Founding era.6 The recent publication of every surviving grand jury charge
from colonial, state, and lower federal courts prior to 1801 makes it possible to
revisit that conclusion. 7 From a careful review of the surviving charges, I have
identified the positions of twenty-eight Founding-era judges, the vast majority
of whom instructed grand juries to use evidentiary standards more demanding
than probable cause. 8 Their insistence on a strict charging standard fit the
5. BILLA VERA: OR, THE ARRAIGNMENT OF IGNORAMUS 13-14 (London 1682).

6. SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 93.
7. See generally GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND JURY: THE SURVIVING GRAND JURY CHARGES
FROM COLONIAL, STATE, AND LOWER FEDERAL COURTS BEFORE 1801 (Stanton D. Krauss

ed., 2012).
8. A note on methods: to identify Founding-era grand jury charges implicating the
evidentiary standard for an indictment in Gentlemen of the Grand Jury, I relied on
Krauss's extensive and meticulous index. 2 id. at 1443 (index entry for grand jury and
standard of proof). I also reviewed a sample of charges not marked in the index as
pertaining to the standard and found no charges with significant discussion of the
charging standard that had been omitted from the index. In an Appendix, on file with
the Author and available on request, I provide the relevant charging language of each
of the twenty-eight judges. In addition to charges from Gentlemen of the GrandJury, the
Appendix contains materials from 2 & 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1988) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. Part A of the Appendix identifies the judges whom I classify
as requiring more than "probable cause" for an indictment. When the language of the
charge is not entirely clear, I include a note explaining the reasons for my
classification. Part B of the Appendix lists the six Founding-era American judges who
advocated that a grand jury should return an indictment based on probable cause alone.
These judges are discussed below in Part II.A.3. Part C of the Appendix collects
footnote continued on next page
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criminal justice system of their day well. Trials during the Founding era were

summary affairs, 9 making an additional check against erroneous conviction
useful. Likewise, the constraint that a strict charging standard imposes
on prosecutors aligns with the Founding generation's anxiety about
concentrations of power.
Part II.B then examines the slow but steady adoption of the probable cause
standard during the late nineteenth

and twentieth

centuries. Previous

scholarship has characterized the emergence of probable cause during this
period as mysterious. 10 I argue that probable cause's rise can be understood as a
corollary of the formalization of criminal procedure, particularly the criminal
trial, during the same time period. Procedural devices like extensive voir dire
and error preservation emerged during the same period that probable cause
became the dominant charging standard."1 By the late nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, criminal procedure carried the appearance of reliability.

Because the criminal justice system had found a different way to accurately
judge guilt, it no longer needed a strict charging standard to satisfy its demand
for certainty-or so it must have seemed to decisionmakers.
Part III applies the framework developed in Parts I and II to the

contemporary use of the probable cause standard. By the second half of the
twentieth century, it had become clear to all that plea bargains, not trials, had
become the primary mechanism of criminal adjudication.1 2 The rise of plea
bargaining undercut the probable cause standard's basic logic: that grand juries

and magistrates need not be certain of a suspect's guilt because trial juries
will be. As Part III.A explains, a substantial body of literature identifies
additional charges (not counted in the twenty-eight) that touch briefly on the charging
standard without clearly articulating a position on the probable-cause-to-certainty
continuum. This includes, for instance, judges who told a grand jury that the evidence
should be "satisfactory" without explaining what counts as satisfactory. See, e.g., John
Sloss Hobart's Charge, City and County of New York, January 1791, in 1 GENTLEMEN
OF THE GRAND JURY, supranote 7, at 682, 683 ("They should be equally as careful not to
bring forward an indictment upon uncertain conjecture or slight presumption, as to
present offenders against the laws, of every degree and description, whenever the
charge is satisfactorily supported.").
9. James D. Rice, The Criminal Trial Before and After the Lawyers Authority, Law, and
Culture in MarylandJury Trials, 1681-1837,40 AM.J. LEGAL HIST. 455,463(1996).
10. See SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 101-11 (arguing that as preliminary hearings replaced

grand juries, the Fourth Amendment's probable cause standard for arrest was imported
to the charging context without anyone giving it much thought); Niki Kuckes, Retelling
Grand Jury History, in GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON THE GRAND JURY 125,
146 (Roger Anthony Fairfax, Jr. ed., 2011) ("How the modern federal courts came to
abandon the prima facie standard in favor of the modern 'probable cause' test is not
clear.").
11. See infra notes 208-16 and accompanying text.
12. See generally GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY

OF PLEA

BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003); Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargainingand Its History, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 1(1979).
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consequences of the criminal justice system's pivot to plea bargaining.
According to many commentators, plea bargaining spawned (i) strong
prosecutorial control over criminal justice,1 3 and (ii) chronic uncertainty about
the factual and/or legal guilt of the individuals punished. 14 To the extent these
critiques are right, plea bargaining diminishes both of the criminal justice
values that strict charging standards offer. The probable cause standard,
moreover, exacerbates these consequences of plea bargaining in important
ways not fully explored in the literature, as Part III.B describes.
Once plea bargaining's domination of the criminal justice system had
become apparent, one might have expected to see a reversion to a stricter
charging standard. That is not, of course, what happened. Part III.C identifies
three ways to understand probable cause's survival in the age of plea
bargaining. First, it may be that policymakers no longer valued certainty of
guilt or constraints on prosecutors as much as they once did. Second,
"voluntary" guilty pleas may have provided, or appeared to provide, an
adequate amount of social certainty of guilt. Third, perhaps policymakers
never reexamined the fit between charging standards and the plea bargaining
regime. This too is plausible. American criminal justice backed into plea
bargaining, and formal law has long been ambivalent about it. 15 It is altogether
possible that probable cause's survival is nothing more (or less) than path
dependency.
A brief Conclusion considers normative implications of the analysis. The
crucial implication is that probable cause is a choice, not a fixed element of our
legal tradition. While the explanations for probable cause's survival in Part III
are descriptively plausible, they are normatively troubling. Charging standards
should fit the criminal justice systems of their day, and ours does not. The time
has come to recalibrate the charging standard to fit the criminal justice system
16
as it exists now.

13. See, e.g., William

J. Stuntz,

Plea Bargainingand CriminalLaw's DisappearingShadow, 117

HARv. L. REv. 2548, 2558 (2004) ("[G]iven the array of weapons the law provides,
prosecutors are often in a position to dictate outcomes, and almost always have much
more to say about those outcomes than do defense attorneys.").
14. See, e.g., Stephen

J. Schulhofer,

Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1985-86

(1992).
15. See Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1121, 1122
(1998) ("Plea bargaining occupies an ambivalent position in the criminal justice
system.").
16. A word on scope: my focus is on the charging standard itself, not the institutional
mechanism for enforcing it. Because grand juries were long tasked with instituting
criminal charges-and still are in the federal courts and many states-the discussion
inevitably revolves heavily around them. As the rise of information charging in the
late nineteenth century demonstrates, however, grand juries need not be the enforcers
of charging standards. See infra notes 178-90 and accompanying text (describing the
growth of charging by prosecutor's "information" rather than indictment). A
substantial body of scholarship identifies reasons separate and apart from the charging
standard why grand juries have been rendered irrelevant in modern criminal justice.

footnote continued on next page
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I.

A Framework for Understanding Criminal Charging Standards
Imagine a criminal justice system with no criminal charging standard

whatsoever. 17 Prosecutors can file formal criminal charges at will, with or
without evidence or suspicion. Cases then proceed to disposition by plea or
trial.
Such a system would differ from one with a charging standard in two
significant ways. First, it would likely have more false positives. That is, it
would probably convict more innocent defendants. 18 Under realistic
assumptions, charging standards prevent some number of innocent defendants
from being charged. 19 Sometimes this is because a magistrate or grand jury,
applying the charging standard, rejects a case. 20 More generally, because
prosecutors make charging decisions in the shadow of the charging standard,

they sometimes decline to file cases where the evidence falls short. A system
without a charging standard lets more innocents proceed to final disposition.
Because all adjudicative systems make mistakes, some innocents will inevitably
be erroneously convicted. 21 In more formal terms, the combination of a
charging standard with a separate merits adjudication is a "second-opinion"

See Kevin K. Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 2333, 2352 (2008)
("Despite the widespread belief that the grand jury's role is to serve as a check on the
prosecutor, the grand jury is widely criticized for failing to live up to this role."); see also
Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80
CORNELL L. REv. 260, 311 (1995) ("As long as the grand jury proceeding is
nonadversarial, and as long as the jurors are asked to make a legal determination based
on a single set of facts, there will be no reason to believe that prosecutors will refrain
from submitting cases because they fear a no bill."). To the extent these accounts are
correct, they are reasons why charging standards might be better enforced by some
other institutional mechanism. See infra note 323 (sketching such an institutional
mechanism).
17. As noted, the Supreme Court has suggested that it may be constitutionally permissible
for states to have such a criminal justice system. See supra note 1.
18. It may also have more false negatives of a particular kind. On false positives and false
negatives in criminal law, see generally Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error in
CriminalJustice, 128 HARV. L. REv. 1065(2015).
19. The crucial assumption is that charging standards act as a constraint on prosecutors. In
other words, the framework assumes that there is some set of cases that prosecutors
would bring in a world without a charging standard that they would or could not bring
in a world with one.

&

20. In the contemporary American criminal justice system, this happens very rarely. See
Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutorsas Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1413, 1418

n.18 (2010).
21. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS FOR

LAWYERS AND LAYMEN 108 (1927) ("All systems of law, however wise, are administered
through men, and therefore may occasionally disclose the frailties of men."); Robert E.
Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1943 (1992)
("Unfortunately, trials make mistakes. Some innocent defendants-no one knows how
many-are convicted.").
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mechanism. 22 When both opinions signal that the defendant is guilty, there is
more reason to be confident that he is. 23
Second, prosecutors in a world without charging standards would possess
an unchecked power to subject people to the rigors and risks of the criminal
process. A standard imposes a constraint. The constraint may be internal-if
the prosecutor feels bound to abide by it. 24 It may be external-if it is enforced
by a magistrate, grand jury, or some other independent body. Or it may be
both.
Criminal charging standards thus have two significant effects on criminal
justice systems: they make them more accurate (with respect to false positives),
and they check prosecutorial authority. The stricter the charging standard, the
greater the effects. The more one ratchets up a charging standard, that is, the
more confident one can be that prosecutors are constrained and that convicted
defendants are actually guilty.
This is a simple framework by design, and it does not purport to "predict"
the selection of a charging standard.25 A predictive model would necessarily
account for additional variables, especially the social costs of charging
standards.26 But while certainty of guilt and constraint on prosecutorial
delegations are not the only considerations bearing on the choice of a charging
standard, they are important ones. If demand for one or the other rises or falls,
or if their supply elsewhere in the criminal justice system changes, there is a
reason to expect a modification in the charging standard. And if the charging
22. See Adrian Vermeule, Second Opinions and Institutional Design, 97 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1435

(2011).
23. See id. at 1456-57.
24. See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV.
29, 51-53 (2002) (arguing for efficacy of internal controls on prosecutorial screening).
25. A more complicated model would account for dynamic interactions of the charging
standard and the adjudicative system. For instance, it may be that juries would be more
careful to avoid erroneous convictions if they knew that there had been no-chargingstage review. On the other side of the coin, if a trial jury knows that the prosecution's
case had already survived a demanding charging standard, it might be less careful in its
review of the evidence. Sorting through these dynamic interactions will be necessary
to any effort to reform the charging standard. Because I do not propose a specific
reform in this Article, I set them to the side.
26. Social costs fall into three categories: First, strict charging standards mean that the
government must (in some cases) expend more resources on criminal investigations, or
at least it must expend more earlier. Second, a strict charging standard will sometimes
cause delay in filing cases, which can be psychically taxing to existing crime victims, see
Rachel I. Wollitzer, Supreme Court Review-Sixth Amendment: Defendant's Right to
Confront Witnesses Constitutionality of Protective Measures in Child Sexual Assault Cases, 79
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 759,786 n.226 (1988) ("Even an adult victim who thoroughly
comprehends the importance of careful investigation and procedural safeguards in the
criminal justice system would feel frustration, pain, and helplessness at the delays and
complexities of the system."), and costly to victims of crimes committed by a suspect
during the delay. Third, if a strict charging standard is externally enforced by a judge
or grand jury, there will be process costs associated with the review.
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standard stays the same despite such changes, that merits further investigation.
As we will see in Part II, the framework helps make sense of the peculiar

history of charging standards in the United States, and Part III demonstrates
that this framework provides useful new ways to understand and evaluate the
probable cause standard under modern criminal justice conditions.
II. A History of Charging Standards
On April 20, 1790, Justice James Wilson charged the first federal circuit
grand jury to sit in Pennsylvania. 27 Recognizing that "little business of a
particular nature" would come before the grand jurors-the first federal crimes
would not be created until later that month-Wilson spoke generally about the
American system of grand and petit juries. 28 He especially wished to discuss the

"manner[] in which grand juries ought to make enquiries," a topic that "well
deserves to be attentively considered." 29 Wilson acknowledged that it had been
"declared by some, that grand juries are only to enquire, 'whether what they
hear be any reason to put the party to answer,'-'that a probable cause to call

him to answer is as much as is required by law."' 30 Wilson found this
unacceptable: "Ought not moral certainty to be deemed the necessary basis, of
what is delivered under the sanction of an obligation so solemn and so strict [as
a grand jury's verdict]?" 31 Then he condemned the "probable cause" doctrine in
the strongest possible terms:
The doctrine, that a grand jury may rest satisfied merely with probabilities, is a
doctrine, dangerous as well as unfounded: It is a doctrine, which may be applied to
countenance and promote the vilest and most oppressive purposes: It may be used,
in pernicious rotation, as a snare, in which the innocent may be entrapped, and as
32
a screen, under the cover of which the guilty may escape.

Fast forward to 1978. In September, the Federal Judicial Conference
approves a "model grand jury charge" designed for use in district courts around
the country. 33 It informs grand jurors that the trial jurors, not them, "decide[]
27. James Wilson, Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of
Pennsylvania (April 12, 1790) [hereinafter Wilson's Charge], in 2 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 8, at 33, 33.
28. On the timing of the first federal crimes, see An Act for the Punishment of Certain
Crimes Against the United States, 1 Stat. 112 (1790); and Paul Taylor, Congress'sPower to
Regulate the FederalJudiciary: What the First Congress and the First Federal Courts Can
Teach Today's Congress and Courts, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 847, 889 (2010) ("[T]he Crimes Act of
1790 defined the nation's first federal crimes.").
29. Wilson's Charge, supranote 27, at 35.
30. Id. at 35 & n.7 (quoting sources the book's editor could not locate).
31. Id. at 36.
32. Id.
33. See REPORT

OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED

(1978).
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whether the accused person is guilty or not guilty of the crime charged in the
indictment."34 Their task is narrower: "[Y]our duty [is] to see to it that
indictments are returned against those who you find probable cause to believe
36
are guilty...."3s Wilson's nightmare had been realized.

This Part seeks to recover the peculiar history of criminal charging
standards in the United States between the Founding and the twentieth
century. Subpart A looks closely at the charging standard at the Founding. The
surviving grand jury charges from the era show that judges who considered
the evidentiary standard overwhelmingly agreed with Justice Wilson.
Subpart B then examines the slow but steady ascent of "probable cause" during
the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
A.

The Founders' Charging Standard

According to Barbara Shapiro's leading historical analysis of AngloAmerican charging standards, no commonly accepted understanding of the
evidentiary standard for an indictment existed during the Founding era. In her
superb study of grand jury charging standards, Shapiro reports that "[d]espite
the constitutional provision and the ringing statements of [Justice] Wilson, no

commonly accepted evidentiary standard emerged in the early years of the
Republic."37 New evidence casts new light on this conclusion.
In 2012, Stanton Krauss published Gentlemen of the Grand Jury, containing
every surviving grand jury charge given by American judges prior to 1801.38

As detailed in this Part, a careful examination of these charges reveals that
among the American judges of the Founding generation who expressed a view,
Justice Wilson's position-that a grand jury should return an indictment only

upon an evidentiary showing more demanding than probable causedominated. While the anti-probable-cause view may or may not rise to the
level of a "commonly accepted evidentiary standard," the newly available

charges demonstrate, at a minimum, that it circulated much more widely than
34. COMM. ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYS., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT

ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM app. A at 12 (1978) [hereinafter JURY
COMMITTEE REPORT]. I am grateful to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts for
providing the report, which is on file with the Author.

35. Id.
36. In 1986, the model grand jury charge was updated. See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 33 (1986). The new version (which is
still in use) tells grand jurors that their job is "to determine whether the government's
evidence as presented to you is sufficient to cause you to conclude that there is probable
cause to believe that the person being investigated committed the offense charged."
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 252 (6th ed. 2013).

37. SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 93; see also Kuckes, supra note 10, at 144 ("In the very early
years of the new American republic, there was apparently no accepted evidentiary
standard for grand jury indictment.").
38. See GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND JURY, supra note 7.
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previously thought. The resistance of many Founding-era judges to criminal
charges based on bare probable cause is powerful evidence, moreover, that the
probable cause standard is not an inevitable or necessary feature of the
American legal tradition.
The Founding-era judges were not writing on a blank slate. They were
responding-sometimes explicitly and more often implicitly-to a vigorous

debate between two groups of English lawyers and judges from the late
seventeenth century. As such, our story begins on the other side of the Atlantic,
in the Restoration-era English contests between Tories-who favored a
precursor of probable cause-and Whigs-who demanded a stricter standard.
Part II.A proceeds as follows: Subpart 1 explains the English debate and its

transmission to America. Subpart 2 describes the charges of the Founding-era
American judges who, like the English Whigs, told grand juries to return

indictments based on evidentiary criteria stricter than probable cause.
Subpart 3 considers the handful of Founding-era judges who gave probable

cause instructions. Finally, Subpart 4 offers an explanation of why many
Founding-era judges gravitated towards the Whig/Wilson view.
1.

The English debate and its transmission

At common law, the job of charging crimes belonged to grand juries. 39

Although the grand jury is traditionally dated to the Assize of Clarendon in
1166,40 for the first 500 years of its existence, no one gave the evidentiary

standard for an indictment the "attentive consideration" that Justice Wilson
thought it deserved. 4 1 Even the great jurist-scholars of the early and midseventeenth century, Edward Coke and Matthew Hale, addressed it only in
passing. Coke averred vaguely that "seeing the indictment is the foundation of

39. There was a limited exception in medieval law: prosecution by "appeal." As Daniel
Klerman explains, "Presentment [by a jury] ... can be seen as an early form of public
prosecution. An appeal, on the other hand, was a private prosecution by the victim
herself or, in homicide cases, by a relative of the victim." Daniel Klerman, Women
Prosecutorsin Thirteenth-CenturyEngland, 14 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 271, 277 (2002).

40. Assize of Clarendon (1166), reprinted in 2 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 1042-1189,
at 440 (David C. Douglas & George W. Greenaway eds., 2d ed. 1981); see MARVIN E.
FRANKEL & GARY P. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTITUTION ON TRIAL 6 (1977)

("The ancestor of the grand jury is said by historians to date from 1166, the year of King
Henry II's Assize of Clarendon."). Some historians find precursors in pre-Norman
England. See Wayne L. Morse, A Survey of the GrandJury System (Part1), 10 OR. L. REV.

101, 102-09 (1931); J.E.R. Stephens, The Growth of Trial by Jury in England, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 150, 156 (1896) (explaining that the Assize of Clarendon was "simply a revival, in
an expanded form, of the old English institution analogous to a Grand Jury, which...
had existed at least since the time of Ethelred II").
41. Wilson's Charge, supra note 27, at 35. At least, no record of sustained attention to the
issue has survived.
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all, it is most necessary to have substantial proof" 42 Somewhat in tension with
Coke, Hale wrote that "in case there be probable evidence," a grand jury "ought
to find the bill, because it is but an accusation, and the party is to be put upon
his trial afterwards."43
Sustained attention to the grand jury's evidentiary standard began in 1677,
when Zachary Babington published Advice to GrandJurors in Cases of Blood.44
Babington, the longtime assize clerk at Oxford, was worried that grand juries
too often returned indictments for manslaughter rather than murder.45 Grand
jurors, he believed, typically lacked the legal knowledge to grade homicides.46
Unlike trial jurors, moreover, they had no access to the defendant's evidence.47
The grand jury's deficient legal and evidentiary tools translated, for
Babington, into a minimalist epistemological conception of indictments. "[I]t is
the duty of all Grand Jurors, in all Cases of blood," Babington explained,
"where the Bill of Indictment is brought unto them for Murther, in case they
find, upon the Evidence, any probabilitythat the person said to be killed in the

Indictment[] was slain by the person charged to do it in the Indictment[, to put
Billa vera [true bill] to that Indictment." 48 Any higher evidentiary standard, in
Babington's view, and the grand jury risked usurping the role of the trial judge
or jury:

.

[H]ow exceeding dangerous and inconvenient were it for Grand Jurors, so far to
anticipate the Judgment of the Court, and to take upon themselves . .. the sole
Judgment of Law in all these Cases, by not finding the Indictment[,] ..
especially ... where they have probable Evidence (for they need no more) to prove
such a person killed by the hands of such a person .... 49

While Babington sought throughout Advice to Grand Jurors to minimize the
grand jury's interference in the administration of criminal justice, he never

42. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND:
CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES

25-26 (London 4th ed. 1669). The Third Part of Coke's Institutes was first published in
1644.
43. 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 157 (Sollom Emlyn ed.,

Savoy, E. & R. Nutt & R. Gosling 1736).
44. See ZACHARY BABINGTON, ADVICE TO GRAND JURORS IN CASES OF BLOOD (London 1680).
45. SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 56.
46. See BABINGTON, supra note 44, at 81-82.
47. Babington argued that grand juries should maximize the trial jury's freedom of action
by returning murder indictments in all homicides. Id. at 15-16. If the trial jury
determined that the proper charge was manslaughter, it could return that verdict on a
murder indictment, but it could not return a murder verdict on a manslaughter
indictment.
48. Id. (emphasis added). He went further later in the tract, writing that a "strong Suspicion,
and the Fame of the Country may (in many cases) be Evidence sufficient ... to find a
Bill." Id. at 119.
49. Id. at 63.
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explained what positive function the grand jury should play. The omission

would become central to the Whigs' response.
Only a few years after Advice to Grand Jurors appeared, the Tory
prosecutions of Whigs Stephen Colledge and Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Earl

of Shaftesbury, thrust the grand jury into the political spotlight. The Colledge
and Shaftesbury cases are inseparable from the political and religious context
of the Exclusion Crisis, which pitted Shaftesbury, an anti-Catholic "country"

politician and the leader of the nascent Whig Party, against King Charles II and
his brother James, the Catholic Duke of York. 50 The major political aim of the
early Whigs was legislation excluding James-whom they saw as embodying
absolutism-from the line of succession. 51 Their power base was the House of

Commons, where they won majorities in three elections held between 1679
and 1681.52 Charles and James's supporters, who became known as the Tories

during this period, fended off exclusionary legislation from their stronghold in
the House of Lords.53 In 1681, the Whigs lost their political clout when Charles
dissolved the Oxford Parliament (so named because it met at the Tory

stronghold of Oxford) without calling new elections. 54 Not satisfied with
merely a political victory, Tories made plans to prosecute several Whigs,
including Shaftesbury. 55 But first, they would need to secure grand jury

indictments.
Colledge, a minor figure in the Whig party, was the warm-up. The Crown
accused him of threatening violence during the Oxford Parliament and asked a
London grand jury to return an indictment for treason. 56 Unfortunately for

50.

See J.R.JONES, THE FIRST WHIGS: THE POLITICS OF THE EXCLUSION CRISIS, 1678-1683,

at 4-

8(1961).
51. Id. at 67-68.
52. Id. at 6-8. Some historians argue that Jones overstated the political importance of both
the Exclusion Crisis and Shaftesbury. See Newton E. Key, 'High Feeding and Smart
Drinking' Associating Hedge-Lane Lords in Exclusion Crisis London, in FEAR, EXCLUSION
AND REVOLUTION: ROGER MORRICE AND BRITAIN IN THE 1680s, at 154, 154-56 (James
McElligott ed., 2006) (describing debate and collecting sources). The important points
for my purposes are that there was a political crisis and that the Earl of Shaftesbury
was a major player in it. At least the main thrust of the debate among historians does
not seem to challenge either point. See id. at 155-56 ("In the wake of this revisionist
deconstruction, the best current analysis of the period arrives at only the diffuse
conclusion 'that the crisis and men's responses to it were more complex than was once
thought."' (quoting MARK KNIGHTS, POLITICS AND OPINION IN CRISIS, 1678-81, at 368
(1994))); see also KNIGHTS, supra, at 5-15.
53. See JONES, supra note 50, at 72-73, 140-41.
54. Id. at 180. Charles could do so because he had made a secret agreement with France for
financial support, rendering revenue bills unnecessary. Id. at 176.

55. See id. at 182, 189.
56. The eventual charges against Colledge are described in The Trial of Stephen Colledge,
at Oxford for High-Treason, August 17, 1681, 33 Car. II, in 3 A COMPLETE COLLECTION
OF STATE-TRIALS, AND PROCEEDINGS UPON HIGH-TREASON, AND OTHER CRIMES AND

footnote continued on next page
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the Crown, London was the Whigs' last remaining bastion of influence. A
Whig-packed grand jury returned an "ignoramus,"what today we would call a
"no bill." 57 Colledge's victory proved short-lived. The Crown brought the case
to a grand jury in Oxford, which returned a true bill. 58

The stage was thus set for the prosecution of Shaftesbury himself, whose
popularity had ebbed since the dissolution of the Oxford Parliament. 59 Tories
saw his prosecution as among the final steps in mopping up the Exclusion
Crisis. 60 The Crown alleged that he had committed treason by threatening
Charles.6 1 Apparently lacking a jurisdictional basis to bring their case outside
London, however, the Tories were stuck with a Whig grand jury.6 2
Chief Justice Pemberton, the presiding Tory judge, attempted to counter

the grand jury's political affiliation by insisting that the evidentiary bar for an
indictment was very low. Although he never cited Babington by name, the
influence was clear. "Look ye, Gentlemen," Pemberton implored, "I must tell
you, That that which is referr'd to you, is to consider, whether, upon what
Evidence you shall have given unto you, there be any Reason or Ground for
the King to call these Persons to an Account." 63 He continued: "A probable
Cause, or some Ground, that the King hath to call these Persons to answer for
it, is enough, Gentlemen, for you to find a Bill, 'tis as much as is by Law
requir'd." 64 Pemberton's gambit failed when the grand jury returned another
ignoramus. 65

MISDEMEANOURS; FROM THE REIGN OF KING RICHARD II TO THE END OF THE REIGN OF

KING GEORGE

I 342 (London 2d ed. 1730) [hereinafter

STATE TRIALS].

57. JONES, supra note 50, at 188-89; see also Gregory T. Fouts, Reading the Jurors Their RightsThe Continuing Question of GrandJury Independence, 79 IND. L.J. 323, 325 n.20 (2004) ("A
refusal to indict results in a 'no bill' or, traditionally, a finding of 'ignoramus' (we ignore

it).").
58. JONES, supra note 50, at 189.

59. Id.
60. See id.
61. See Proceedings at the Old-Baily, upon the Bill of Indictment for High-Treason Against
Anthony Earl of Shaftsbury, November 24, 1681, 33 Car. II, in 3 STATE TRIALS, supra
note 56, at 414, 418.
62. See JONES, supra note 50, at 191 (describing the procedure by which Whig officials
selected the Shaftesbury grand jury).
63. Proceedings at the Old-Baily, supra note 61, at 415-16.
64. Id. at 416.
65. The record reflects that when the ignoramus was returned, "the People fell a hollowing
and shouting." Id. at 437 (italics omitted). The Crown's overreach had the effect of
briefly restoring some of Shaftesbury's lost popularity. JONES, supra note 50, at 194. By
1682, however, the Tories had consolidated their influence in London. Id. at 198-206.
Fearing another grand jury proceeding (then, as now, a grand jury ignoramus was no
bar to subsequent prosecution), Shaftesbury fled into exile. See K.H.D. HALEY, THE FIRST
EARL OF SHAFTESBURY 728 (1968) (noting Shaftesbury's departure); Ric Simmons, ReExamining the GrandJury Is There Room for Democracy in the CriminalJustice System?, 82
footnote continued on next page
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In the aftermath of the Colledge and Shaftesbury cases, books and
pamphlets about the evidentiary standard for an indictment proliferated.
Many of the contemporary pamphleteers praised the London grand juries.
Henry Care, a prominent Whig, included a section on grand juries in his
influential book, English Liberties Or, The Freeborn Subject's Inheritance, first
published in 1681 or 1682.66 Grand jurors, just like petit jurors, Care wrote,

must "be fully satisfied in their Consciences, that [the defendant] is Guilty."67
Care also responded to the "probable cause" standard advanced by Pemberton:
"People may tell you, That you ought to find a Bill upon any probable
Evidence, for 'tis but matter of Course, a Ceremony, a Business of Form, only
an Accusation ...

:.68

This cannot be, Care reasoned, or else "to what purpose

have we Grand Juries at all?"69 An anonymous pamphleteer echoed this theme,
explaining that the idea that grand juries should return indictments based on
the "probabilityof the thing" rendered them "[o]nly for show." 70

The most sophisticated writing on the Whig side-indeed the Whigs' real
answer to Babington-was The Security of Englishmen's Lives, written in 1681 by
Lord John Somers. 71 Early in the tract, Somers offered what Babington had

not-an explanation of the grand jury's function. "Our ancestors" instituted a
grand jury, Somers reasoned, because they "thought it not best to trust" the
power of criminal accusation to
any officer of the king's, or in any judges named by him, nor in any certain
number of men during life, lest they should be awed or influenced by great men,
corrupted by bribes, flatteries, or love of power, or become negligent, or partial to
friends and relations, or pursue their own quarrels or private revenges, or
72
connive at the conspiracies of others, and indict thereupon.

Somers thus saw the grand jury as a vital check against the dangers inherent in
delegating prosecutorial power to the King's officials.

His understanding of the grand jury's role led Somers to a strict
evidentiary criterion for an indictment: a grand juror should vote to find a true
bill only if his conscience is satisfied that the defendant is in fact guilty.73 This
B.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2002) ("Shaftesbury himself was forced to flee the country rather than
risk being brought before a second, less sympathetic grand jury.").
66. See HENRY CARE, ENGLISH LIBERTIES: OR, THE FREE-BORN SUBJECT'S INHERITANCE
(London, George Larkin 1682). On the publication date of Care's first edition, see
SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 285 n.72.
67. CARE, supra note 66, at 207.
68.

Id. at 219 (italics omitted).

69. Id. (italics omitted).
70. A GUIDE TO ENGLISH JURIES: SETTING FORTH THEIR ANTIQUITY, POWER, AND DUTY,
FROM THE COMMON-LAW, AND STATUTES 53 (London 1682).
71. See JOHN SOMERS, THE SECURITY OF ENGLISHMEN'S LIVES, OR THE TRUST, POWER, AND

DUTY OF THE GRANDJURIESOF ENGLAND (Tewkesbury, W. Dyde 1798) (1681).
72. Id. at 27.
73. See id. at 46-47,64-65.
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standard was, to Somers, anathema to the Tory focus on "probabilities."
"Probable, is a logical term," he explained, "relating to such propositions, as
have an appearance, but no certainty of truth; shewing rather what is not, than
what is the matter of syllogisms." 74 Somers allowed that "[t]hese may be
allowed in rhetorick," but not "in logick, whose object is truth."75
The debate between the Whigs and the Tories was conducted in
epistemological terms-should an indictment require "certainty" or
"probability"? Not far beneath the debate's surface lurked a fiercely contested
political question: Should grand juries constrain prosecutors? The parties'
positions were dictated by the facts on the ground. Tories controlled the
prosecutorial function. Whigs did not. Predictably, when Whigs were haled
before grand juries on political charges, their allies championed the grand jury
as a check

against delegated prosecutorial power. And they adopted a

demanding charging standard, backed by moral and epistemic arguments. For
the Tories, checks on prosecutorial power obstructed the plan to prosecute
their political rivals. Inevitably, the Tories gravitated to a permissive charging

standard, which they justified by touting the epistemic advantages of petit over
grand juries.

My concern is not with the Whigs and Tories per se, but with their impact
on American thinking. Americans learned about their debate, and generally
about the English law of grand juries, in three main ways: reprinted Whig
tracts, legal treatises, and justice of the peace manuals.
First, Americans read Whig writing about the indictment standard. Two

of the most significant Whig pamphlets of the debate were reprinted in
America.76 Somers's The Security of Englishmen's Lives was printed in New York
74. Id at 89. Recalling the case of two officials convicted of treason for attempting to
abolish the grand jury during the sixteenth century, Somers exclaimed that those who
"obliquely endeavour[] to render grand juries useless" are no "less criminal, than he that
would absolutely abolish them." Id. at 79-80. It is hard to read this as anything other
than a criminal accusation against Babington and Pemberton.

&

75. Id. at 89-90. Whig writers predominated in the aftermath of the Colledge and
Shaftesbury proceedings, but the Tories were not without retort. An anonymous
pamphleteer in Billa Vera: Or, The Arraignment of Ignoramus demanded to know: "Was
there no Colour, no probable ground, no sufficient matter for an Accusation?" BILLA
VERA, supra note 5, at 26 (emphasis omitted). The pamphlet has been attributed to
Laurence Womock. See Simon Stern, Note, Between Local Knowledge and National Politics
Debating Rationales for Jury Nullification After Bushell's Case, 111 YALE L.J. 1815, 1850
n.174 (2002). Similarly, Tory Roger North defended the "probable cause" doctrine in his
book Examen, writing that if the evidence before the grand jury "be lawful and full," it
must return the indictment and leave it to the petit jury to judge the circumstances and
the credibility of the witnesses. ROGER NORTH, EXAMEN: OR, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE
CREDIT AND VERACITY OF A PRETENDED COMPLETE HISTORY 113-14 (London 1740). But
on the whole, the Tory side lacked any particularly sophisticated response to Somers.
This may explain the third reprinting of Babington in 1692.
76. Imported copies of the Whig and Tory grand jury pamphlets of the 1670s and 1680s
may have also made their way into American law libraries. Herbert Johnson's catalog
of imported law books in eighteenth-century American libraries indicates that Henry
footnote continued on next page
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in 1773,77 and Henry Care's English Liberties was printed in Boston in 1721 and

Providence in 1774.78 On the other hand, none of the Tory pamphlets of the
debate seem to have been reprinted in America. Americans apparently had an
appetite for Whig writing on grand juries, especially in the run-up to
independence.

Treatises were the second major source of American knowledge of English
grand juries. Two are particularly important: Matthew Hale's History of the

Pleas of the Crown and William Blackstone's Commentarieson the Law of England.
I have already noted Hale's remark ratifying the Tory position, which was
written sometime before the Whig-Tory debate. 79 Curiously, when his treatise
was published posthumously in 1736, its editor appended a footnote suggesting

that the law of indictments had since moved towards the Whig view. 80
As on so many issues, Blackstone was also influential on American
thinking. Here, in full, is his analysis of the grand jury's evidentiary standard:
[T]hey are only to hear evidence on behalf of the prosecution: for the finding of
an indictment is only in the nature of an inquiry or accusation, which is
afterwards to be tried and determined; and the grand jury are only to inquire
upon their oaths, whether there be sufficient cause to call upon the party to
answer it. A grand jury however ought to be thoroughly persuaded of the truth of
an indictment, so far as their evidence goes; and not to rest satisfied merely with

Care's English Liberties was in the libraries of William Byrd II, Robert Treat Paine, and
St. George Tucker. See HERBERT A. JOHNSON, IMPORTED EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY LAW
TREATISES IN AMERICAN LIBRARIES, 1700-1799, at 12 (1978). In a 1706 grand jury charge,
moreover, Nicholas Trott, the first Chief Justice of South Carolina, cited Babington's
Advice to Grand Jurors, indicating that Trott at least had knowledge of Babington's
argument, if not the book itself. See infra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing
Trott's charge).
77. 1 MORRIS L. COHEN, BIBLIOGRAPHY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW 140 (1998).

78. Id. at 713-14.
79. 1 HALE, supranote 43, at 157 (stating that "in case there be probable evidence," the grand
jury "ought to find the bill, because it is but an accusation, and the party is to be put
upon his trial afterwards" (emphasis omitted)). Because Hale's treatise was published
posthumously, see Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the FramersKnow, and When Did They
Know Its Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 129
(2005), the exact date of his writing is unknown. Shapiro estimates that Hale was
writing around 1667. SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 55.
80. In the footnote, Hale's editor wrote:
This same doctrine is laid down by C.J. Pemberton, in the case of the earl of
Shaftsbury. Vide tamen Sir John Hawles remarks on that case, wherein he unanswerably
shews, that a grand-jury ought to have the same persuasion of the truth of the indictment,
as a petit jury, or a coroner's inquest.
1 HALE, supra note 43, at 157 n.(a) (italics omitted) (citations omitted). The reference is
to John Hawles's 1689 commentary on the Shaftesbury proceedings. See JOHN HAWLES,
REMARKS UPON THE TRYALS 47-48 (London 1689) (criticizing Pemberton's "probable
cause" instruction). By maintaining that Hawles's critique of Pemberton, and by
extension, Hale, was "unanswerable," the editor suggests that the law had evolved
between Hale's writing and its publication.
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remote probabilities: a doctrine, that might be applied to very oppressive
purposes.8 1

While Blackstone is not unequivocal,8 2 he does take a side in the Whig-Tory
contest. The replacement of "sufficient cause" for the preferred Tory
formulation of "probable cause" is telling. Still more revealing is his insistence
that the grand jury must be "thoroughly persuaded of the truth" of the
indictment, a notion incompatible with Tory thinking. But the coup de grace is
a footnote at the end of Blackstone's discussion citing a Whig critic of Chief
Justice Pemberton for the proposition that the "remote probabilities" standard
can lead to "oppressive purposes."83 This is, in context, a direct attack on
Pemberton. While the Whigs would have pushed back against Blackstone's

claim that the indictment is only an "accusation," rather than a "verdict,"they
would, on the whole, have embraced his text. The Tories would have resisted
it.

Third, and most importantly, Americans learned of the Whig-Tory debate
in justice of the peace manuals. As Thomas Davies has noted, justice of the
peace manuals were "probably the sources regarding criminal procedure that
were most accessible to members of the Framers' generation."84 Beginning in
1765, manuals began to appear in the colonies based on Burn's The Justice of the
Peace, and Parish Officer, a popular British work.85 Burn, and his American
81. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *303.
82. See SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 82 (arguing that Blackstone attempted to combine the
Whig and Tory views).
83. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 81, at *303 & n.8 (citing Remarks on the Earl of Shaftesbury's
Grand Jury, in 4 STATE TRIALS, supra note 56, at 183, 183).
84. Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of
the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37

WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 280 (2002).
85. RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER (London, Henry Lintot

1755). The first American manual based on Burn was Conductor Generalis. See Thomas Y.
Davies, How the Post-Framing Adoption of the Bare-Probable-Cause Standard Drastically
Expanded Government Arrest and Search Power, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 9 n.18
(2010). Prior to 1765, three American justice of the peace manuals articulated views
consistent with Whig thinking about grand juries. The first American manual,
published in 1711, emphasized the similarity between the grand and petit juries: "[N]o
Man's Life ... shall be touched for any Crime whatsoever, but upon being found Guilty
on two several Tryals, for so may that of the Grand and Petty Jury be rightly
termed .... " CONDUCTOR GENERALIS: OR, A GUIDE FOR JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 156
(New York 1711). The next, in 1722, declared that an indictment, "being in the Nature
of a Declaration for the King, ought to be certain, and must not be spplyed by
Implication or Intendment." CONDUCTOR GENERALIS: OR THE OFFICE, DUTY AND
AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 140 (Philadelphia, Andrew Bradford 1722). In
1750, Benjamin Franklin published a second edition of the 1722 manual. It maintained
(in slightly modified form) the language just quoted and added that "Indictments ought
to be framed so near the Truth as may be, and the rather, for that they are to be found
by the Jury upon their Oaths." CONDUCTOR GENERALIS: OR, THE OFFICE, DUTY AND
AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 171 (Philadelphia, B. Franklin & D. Hall, 2d ed.

1750) (1722).
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followers, provided the following extended description of the Whig-Tory
debate:
Lord Hale says, that the grand jury at the assizes or sessions ought only to
hear the evidence for the king, and in case there be probable evidence, they ought
to find the bill, because it is but an accusation, and the party is to be put on his
trial afterwards.
Which doctrine is also laid down by Chief Justice Pemberton, in the case of
the Earl of Shaftesbury.
But the learned editor of Hale's History observes upon this, that Sir John
Hawles in his remarks on the said case, unanswerably shews, that a grand jury
ought to have the same persuasion of the truth of the indictment as a petty jury,
or a coroner's inquest; for they are sworn to present the truth, and nothing but
the truth.
And L. Coke says, that seeing indictments are the foundation of all, and are
commonly found in the absence of the party accused, it is necessary there should
86
be substantial proof.

Manuals containing this language were printed widely in America. 87
Shapiro argues that readers of Burn's manual (and the manuals derived
from it) must have been puzzled by how to reconcile the views of Hale and

Pemberton, on the one hand, and Hale's editors and Hawles, on the other, with
Coke perhaps "seem[ing] to offer a third alternative." 88 This is possible, but the
text can also be read as presenting the reader with distinct alternatives. Of
course, that still leaves readers with the problem of choosing Option A (Hale
and Pemberton) or Option B (Hale's editor, Hawles, and maybe Coke). As we
will see, many American judges of the Founding era did see this as a choice, and
they overwhelmingly picked Option B.

86. 2 BURN, supra note 85, at 26 (italics omitted) (citations omitted).
87. Specifically, manuals containing the language were printed in Boston in 1773, see
ABRIDGMENT OF BURN'S JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER (Boston,

Joseph

Greenleaf 1773); Williamsburg in 1774, see RICHARD STARKE, THE OFFICE AND
AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF PEACE (Williamsburg, Alexander Purdie & John Dixon
1774); New York in 1788 (twice), see THE CONDUCTOR GENERALIS: OR, THE OFFICE,
DUTY AND AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE (New York, Hugh Gaine 1788); JAMES
PARKER, CONDUCTOR GENERALIS: OR, THE OFFICE, DUTY AND AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES OF

THE PEACE (New York, John Patterson 1788); Philadelphia in both 1788 and 1792, see
THE CONDUCTOR GENERALIS: OR, THE OFFICE, DUTY AND AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES OF THE
PEACE (Philadelphia 1792); THE SOUTH-CAROLINA JUSTICE OF PEACE (Philadelphia,
R. Aitken & Son 1788); Albany in 1794, see THE CONDUCTOR GENERALIS: OR, THE
OFFICE, DUTY AND AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE (Albany, Charles R. & George
Webster 1794); Richmond in 1795, see WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE NEW VIRGINIA
JUSTICE, COMPRISING THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, IN THE

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (Richmond, T. Nicolson 1795); and Philadelphia again in
1801, see THE CONDUCTOR GENERALIS: OR, THE OFFICE, DUTY AND AUTHORITY OF

JUSTICES OF THE PEACE (Philadelphia, Charless 1801). As discussed below, other manuals,
not based on Burn, did exist. See infra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
88. SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 86.
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2.

The Founding: general view

Until recently, the readily available historical record included the views of
only a handful of Founding-era judges about the evidentiary standard for an
indictment. Thanks to the publication of Gentlemen of the Grand Jury,89 the
situation has improved markedly.
Grand jury charges in the Founding era had a variety of functions. As
Roger Fairfax observes, some judges used them to "lecture captive audiences of
prominent local citizens on political issues of the day." 90 Many judges also
oriented the grand jurors to the task before them. They explained the
jurisdiction's substantive criminal law, 91 the process for receiving witness
testimony, 92 and the grand jury's relationship with the prosecuting attorney. 93
In many instances, judges also instructed the jurors on the quantum of evidence
they should demand before returning an indictment, an issue that almost never
appeared in published legal opinions. 94 Grand jury charges thus open an

extraordinary window into the thinking of early American jurists about the
evidentiary requirement for a criminal charge.
Founding-era judicial instructions about the quantum of evidence required
for an indictment were not uniform, but neither were they closely divided

between Whig and Tory views. As this and the next Subparts show, in
Founding-era America, among judges who addressed the issue, the Whigs won.
Several judges adopted Blackstone's "thoroughly persuaded" language.
Judge Thomas Waties's 1789 charge to a South Carolina grand jury is typical of
this approach: "[Y]ou ought to be thoroughly persuaded of the truth of an
indictment, as far as the evidence goes, before you assent to it; and ought not to

send a person to his trial upon probable grounds only, and the mere
presumption of criminality." 9 5 Other charges told the grand jury to find an
89. GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND JURY, supra note 7.

90. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., GrandJury Discretionand Constitutional Design, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
703, 730 n.155 (2008).
91. See, e.g., Francis Dana's Charge, 1791, in 1 GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND JURY, supranote 7,
at 400, 400-05 (describing substantive criminal law of Massachusetts).
92. See, e.g., St. George Tucker's Charge, June, 1793, in 2 GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND JURY,
supra note 7, at 1351, 1351 ("[S]hould you wish to have Witnesses brought before you,
the Court will order the proper process for that purpose, on your application.").
93. See, e.g., id. ("Indictments will be sent up to you in some Cases by the [Attorney] for the
[Commonwealth].").

94. I am aware of only one: Respublica v. Shaffer, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 236, 237 (Pa. 1788).

&

95. Thomas Waties's Charge, Beaufort, Orangeburgh, & Ninety-Six Districts, 1789, in 2
GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND JURY, supra note 7, at 1243, 1243. Additional Blackstonian
charges include Alexander Addison's Charge, Allegheny, Fayette, Washington,
Westmoreland Counties, September, 1792, in 2 GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND JURY, supra
note 7, at 809, 814; John Houstoun's Charge, Liberty County, January 31, 1792, in 1
GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND JURY, supra note 7, at 108, 109; Rufus Putnam's Charge,
Hamilton County, October 7, 1794, in 2 GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND JURY, supra note 7,
footnote continued on next page
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indictment only if it was "satisfied,"96 "well satisfied," 97 "fully satisflied]," 98
"convince[d],"99 or "well convinced"1 00 of the defendant's guilt. At least two

judges incorporated the Whig idea that grand jurors should present a
defendant for trial only if their "consciences" were "satisfied."101 Yet other
judges instructed grand juries to find an indictment only with "the most

unequivocal evidence," 102 "moral certainty,"103 evidence "sufficient to
convict," 104 the "most probable grounds,"1 05 the "strongest appearance of
criminality,"106 or when it had no "reasonable cause of Doubt." 10 7 While these
formulations offer a range of certainty levels, they share a common theme: all
go beyond, and often far beyond, the bare "probable cause" criterion advanced
by the English Tories.
While the charges sometimes simply asserted a particular evidentiary
criterion, many judges explained their thinking. Like the Whigs before them,
several Founding-era judges expressly criticized criminal charges based on
"probabilities."We have already seen Justice James Wilson's argument that the
probable cause standard could be applied to "promote the vilest and most
oppressive purposes."1 08 Other judges echoed this concern. Chief Justice James
Kinsey of New Jersey found the probable cause standard inconsistent with the
grand juror's oath:
at 727, 730; and George Turner's Charge, Hamilton County, April 8, 1794, in 2
GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND JURY, supra note 7, at 725, 726.
96. Edward Shippen's Charge, City of Philadelphia, October 24, 1785, in 2 GENTLEMEN OF
THE GRAND JURY, supra note 7, at 770, 773.

97. Francis Dana, Undated Charge Number 4, in 1 GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND JURY, supra
note 7, at 558, 559.

98. Edward Shippen's Charge, Philadelphia County, August 23, 1794, in 2 GENTLEMEN OF
THE GRAND JURY, supra note 7, at 866, 869.
99. William Goforth's Charge, Hamilton County, February, 1795, in 2 GENTLEMEN OF THE
GRAND JURY, supra note 7, at 730, 733.
100. William Stith's Charge, Greene County, January, 1794, in 1 GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND
JURY, supra note 7, at 129, 129.
101. Thomas Waties's Charge, supra note 95, at 1243; accord Edward Shippen's Charge, 1791,
in 2 GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND JURY, supra note 7, at 777; Edward Shippen's Charge,
November, 1800, in 2 GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND JURY, supra note 7, at 1068, 1069.

102. John Williams's Charge, Washington County, 1791, in

1 GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND

JURY, supra note 7, at 686, 687.

103. Wilson's Charge, supra note 27, at 36.
104. Lot Hall's Charge, Windham County, August, 1797, in 2 GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND
JURY, supra note 7, at 1309, 1311.
105. Enoch Edwards's Charge, Philadelphia County, March 7, 1791, in 2 GENTLEMEN OF THE
GRANDJURY, supra note 7, at 780, 783.
106. Id.
107. Nathaniel Peaslee Sargent's Charge, Middlesex County, November, 1780 (and Earlier),
in 1 GENTLEMEN OF THE GRANDJURY, supra note 7, at 347, 348.
108. Wilson's Charge, supra note 27, at 35-36.
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[T]ho' I have often heard it laid down as a rule, that probability is a sufficient
ground for you to indict a citizen, . .. [I] have always viewed it as a principle
against which reason revolts. . .. Indeed if the oath of a Grand-Juryman be
considered and compared with that of the Petit-jury, and if it also be considered
that those writers who absurdly advance this doctrine tell you that probability is
by no means sufficient for a Petit-jury to convict, and that it ought to weigh but
little, I confess I cannot suggest to myself any solid ground for the distinction
made between a Petit and a Grand-jury .... 109

South Carolina's Judge Waties agreed: "When indeed you recollect that you are
sworn 'to present nothing but the truth,' you will without doubt require
something more than probability to support every charge...."110
The notion that the grand jury's inquiry should be as strict or stricter than
the petit jury's recurred frequently. "[W]hy should a less evidence indict a
man," Judge William Cooper of New York asked, "than the petit-jury have for
their verdict?" 111 "[G]reater exactness and diligence," he continued, "is required

of the grand-jury." 112 For Judge Edward Shippen of Pennsylvania, the
concurrence of grand and petit jury protects liberty:
So tender is the Law, and so indulgent to every Person charged with a
criminal Offence, that before any Bill of Indictment can be returned a true Bill,
there must be at least twelve of the Grand Jury who must concur in finding the
Charge again him satisfactorily proved; and after that, before he can be finally
convicted, the whole Petit Jury must agree in the same Judgment; So that twenty
four at least of his fellow Citizens must be satisfied of his guilt, before the Law can
113
punish him.

In a similar vein, Justice Samuel Chase wrote that "every Grand Jury, before

they find an indictment, should expect the same proof, and as satisfactory
evidenc[e] of the guilt of the accused as the Petit Jury would require to Justify
their verdict against him." 114
Other judges connected a strict evidentiary requirement to the fact that
grand jurors heard only the government's evidence. Justice Francis Dana of
Massachusetts, for instance, noted in an undated charge that because the grand
109. James Kinsey's Charge, Hunterdon County, April 6, 1790, in
GRANDJURY, supra note 7, at 597, 599.

1

GENTLEMEN OF THE

110. Thomas Waties's Charge, supra note 95, at 1243.
111. William Cooper's Charge, Otsego County, 1791, in 1 GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND JURY,
supra note 7, at 685, 686.
112. Id.

113. Edward Shippen's Charge, supranote 96, at 773; see also Thomas Carnes's Charge, Burke
County, September, 1798, in 1 GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND JURY, supra note 7, at 206,
207. Justice Blair of the Supreme Court took the same view. John Blair's Charge to the
Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of Delaware, October 27, 1794, in 2
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 8, at 485, 485.
114. Samuel Chase's Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of
Pennsylvania, April 12, 1800, in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 8, at 408, 409
(alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
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jury would proceed in secret and hear only the government's witnesses, "you
are to proceed with due caution and to be well satisfied that the evidence laid

before you ... is sufficient to do away the first presumption of Innocence,
before you establish the accusation." 115 Likewise, Pennsylvania's Judge Shippen
explained in 1793 that:
As you hear the Evidence on one Side only, that Evidence should be full and
convincing; it is not enough that there are probable Grounds of the Guilt of the
party but the proof must be either positive, or strongly presumptive, before you
put the party to the Hazard Pain or Expence of a public Trial. 1 16

Yet another argument grounded a strict evidentiary criterion in the
presumption of innocence. Judge Alexander Addison of Pennsylvania wrote

that when the evidence against a suspect is "light or rash," the "common
presumption of innocence is a sufficient counterpoise, and you may safely
disregard an accusation so lightly supported."1 1 7 Massachusetts's Justice Dana
concurred: "In all your enquiries Gentlemen take this maxim with you, That
the Law presumes every Man innocent untill his guilt is made apparent."118
3.

The Founding: outliers

From the surviving grand jury charges, we know that at least six
Founding-era American judges charged grand jurors to return an indictment

on probable cause alone. 119 Four of them-William Henry Drayton, Henry
Pendleton, John Faucheraud Grimke, and Elihu Hall Bay-were from South
115. Francis Dana, supra note 97, at 559.
116. Edward Shippen's Charge, Bucks County, October, 1793, in 2 GENTLEMEN OF THE
GRAND JURY, supra note 7, at 848, 849; see also James Iredell's Charge to the Grand Jury
of the Circuit Court for the District of Georgia, October 17, 1791, in 2 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 8, at 216, 223 ("[Als the evidence to a Grand Jury is usually, and
perhaps ought always, to be on the side of the prosecution only ... unless there is a high
probability from the evidence before the Grand Jury, there is little prospect of a final
conviction by the petit jury, who may have more favorable evidence for the person
accused, but can be seldom expected to have stronger against him....").
117. Alexander Addison's Charge, supra note 95, at 814. Later in the charge, Addison adds:
"For a grand jury ought to be thoroughly persuaded of the truth of an indictment, so
far as their evidence goes, and not rest satisfied merely with remote probabilities." Id.
118. Francis Dana, Undated Charge Number 3, in 1 GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND JURY, supra
note 7, at 557, 557 (emphasis omitted).
119. I have excluded from this study a 1779 grand jury charge by Judge Anthony Stokes,
who came to Georgia from England shortly before the Revolutionary War erupted. In
a postwar memoir, Stokes makes clear that he was a British judge doing temporary
duty in America, not an American. ANTHONY STOKES, A NARRATIVE OF THE OFFICIAL
CONDUCT OF ANTHONY STOKES 109 (London 1784). Indeed, during the war he was
captured by American military forces, id. at 28-29, released, id. at 34-35, went to Great
Britain, id. at 45, and then returned during a British countercharge, id. at 49-51. His
views on the proper criminal charging standard might be probative of contemporary
thinking in London, a topic beyond my scope, but he was not a member of the
Founding generation of American judges.

533

Probable Cause Revisited
68 STAN. L. REV. 511(2016)

Carolina, while the other two-Thomas McKean and Richard Peters-presided
in Pennsylvania.
a.

South Carolina

Between 1774 and 1784, three South Carolina judges charged grand juries
in conformity with the Tory probable cause standard.120 None of the charges
contained a detailed explanation of the standard's logic. The most elaborate
justification was from Judge Grimke, who explained the probable cause
standard as a kind of inverted Blackstone ratio:
[I]t is not to be understood that you are to make so minute an investigation into
such matters, as are the proper subjects of your enquiry, as to establish the fact
itself. You are to find the bill, tho' founded only upon probable grounds of
suspicion, that the accused is guilty... . And in conformity to that wise maxim
which declares that it is better that ten guilty men should elude the justice of the
Courts of Law, than that one innocent person should suffer unmeritedly; it is
likewise preferable, that ten guiltless persons should undergo the inconveniency
of an examination before you, than that one offender should triumph in his
crimes with impunity.121

South Carolina is exceptional for two reasons. First, prior to 1788, South
Carolina did not have a justice of the peace manual based on Burn's Country
Justice.122 Its manual, William Simpson's The PracticalJustice of the Peace and
Parish-Officer, of His Majesty's Province of South-Carolina,first published in 1761,
lacked the standard text describing the positions of Hale, Pemberton, Hale's
editor, Hawles, and Coke on the indictment standard. 123 Indeed, it did not offer
any guidance at all about the evidentiary requirement for an indictment.
Where, then, did the South Carolina judges derive the probable cause

standard? The likely explanation-and the second reason South Carolina is
exceptional-is that they found it in an early eighteenth-century grand jury
charge by Nicholas Trott, South Carolina's first Chief Justice. Trott, who
120. See William Henry Drayton's Charge, Camden, Cheraws, & Georgetown Districts,
November 5, 15, & 26, 1774, in 2 GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND JURY, supra note 7, at 1179,
1181 ("[F]ind all such Bills of Indictment, as the examination of Witnesses in support of
them, may induce you to think there is a probability that the fact charged is true.. .. ");
John Faucheraud Grimke's Charge, Cheraws, Camden, & Georgetown Districts,
November 15 & 26, 1783, & April 5, 1784, in 2 GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND JURY, supra
note 7, at 1220, 1225 ("You are going to find the bill, tho' founded only upon probable
grounds of suspicion, that the accused is guilty .... "); Henry Pendleton's Charge,
Ninety-Six & Beaufort Districts, November, 1776, in 2 GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND
JURY, supra note 7, at 1205, 1208 ("[Y]ou have nothing to do; but to find whether there is
or is not probable Cause of Prosecution....").
121. John Faucheraud Grimke's Charge, supranote 120, at 1225; see also 4 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 81, at 1352.
122. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
123. See WILLIAM SIMPSON, THE PRACTICAL JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH-OFFICER, OF

His MAJESTY'S PROVINCE OF SOUTH-CAROLINA (Charlestown, Robert Wells 1761).
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received his legal training in England in the 1690s before travelling to South

Carolina,1 24 apparently knew the then-recent Whig-Tory debate well. In a
1706 charge, he cited Babington's Advice to GrandJurorsfor the proposition that:
You are not to try ye Prisoner but to consider whither or no there is just
cause of Accusation, or that probable proof of ye fact laid in the Charge, as that
the Person ought to be put upon his Tryal for the same; For then there is an other
Jury which properly are said to try ye Prisoner, and are to pass between him & ye
Queen upon his Life or Death.12 5

It seems likely that Trott's charge was the source material for Judges Drayton,
Pendleton, and Grimke.1 26
In 1788 a new justice of the peace manual appeared, The South-Carolina
Justice of the Peace. 127 A preface complained that Simpson's manual, which it

effectively replaced, contained only the "rudiments" of materials magistrates
needed to perform their duties. 128 The new manual included Burn's familiar
account of the Whig-Tory debate.1 29 The next year, Judge Thomas Waties
charged a South Carolina grand jury in accord with the Whig view, telling the

jury (as quoted above), that it "ought not to send a person to his trial upon
probable grounds only, and the mere presumption of criminality."1 30 While
South Carolina appears to have been moving toward the more common

American view of the charging standard, two years later, another South
Carolina judge, Elihu Hall Bay, told a grand jury that it was to determine

"whether there are probable grounds for prosecuting the offenders complained
of."1 31 Thus, even after its new justice of the peace manual and Waties's
impassioned critique of the probable cause standard, South Carolina may have
remained an outlier.

124. L. Lynn Hogue, The Sources of Trott's Grand Jury Charges, in SOUTH CAROLINA LEGAL
HIsTORY 23, 25-26 (Herbert A. Johnson ed., 1980).
125. Nicholas Trott's Charge, Province of South Carolina, March 20, 1706, in 2 GENTLEMEN
OF THE GRAND JURY, supra note 7, at 1123, 1124 & n.h (emphasis omitted). This is the
only citation to Babington I have found in any early American source.
126. Trott's 1706 charge was published within a manuscript entitled Eight Charges Delivered
at So Many Several GeneralSessions & Gaol Deliveries Held at Charles Town for the Province
of South Carolina. In the Years 1703, 1704, 1705, 1706 1707. Together with a General Charge to
the Grand Juriesfor the Said Province. See Nicholas Trott's Charge, supra note 125, at 1123
n.I. I have not determined how widely the manuscript circulated.
127. See THE SOUTH-CAROLINA JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, supra note 87.

128. Id. at v.
129. Id. at 270.
130. Thomas Waties's Charge, supra note 95, at 1243.
131. Elihu Hall Bay's Charge, Camden District, April, 1791, in 2 GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND
JURY, supra note 7, at 1258, 1259.
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b.

Pennsylvania

Compare two grand jury charges by Pennsylvania Chief Justice Thomas
McKean. The first is from 1778: "We now beg leave to dismiss you, with this
recommendation, in all doubtful cases to incline rather to acquital than
crimination; for it is safer to err in acquitting than in punishing, on the side of
mercy than on the side of justice." 132 A decade later, McKean told another
grand jury:
[T]he bills, or presentments, found by a grand Jury, amount to nothing more than
an official accusation, in order to put the party accused upon his trial .... It is the
duty of the Grand-Jury to enquire into the nature and probable grounds of the
charge; but it is the exclusive province of the Petty Jury, to hear and determine ...
13 3
whether the Defendant is, or is not, guilty ....

The two charges can perhaps be reconciled, but the change in tone is striking.
The 1778 version of McKean is almost Whiggish, but by 1788 he is a fierce
Tory. Why the shift?
McKean's private thoughts on the matter are lost to time, but the answer

may lie in a bitter dispute he had with a Philadelphia grand jury in late 1782
and early 1783. It began when McKean levied hefty criminal fines against two
retired army officers convicted of assault. 134 The fines, and a nasty comment
McKean made to one of the defendants, drew the ire of Philadelphia printer
135
Eleazer Oswald, who published columns critical of McKean in his paper.
Incensed by Oswald's impetuousness, McKean had him arrested and presented
to the grand jury for seditious libel. 136 After the grand jury twice refused to
indict, McKean summoned it for (in the words of a grand juror) a
"reprimand."1 37 McKean ordered the grand jury to reconsider, but it stuck to its
position.138

The incident inspired a flurry of newspaper columns and essays on both
grand juries and the law of seditious libel. 139 The grand jury itself penned a
132. Thomas McKean's Charge, York County, April 21, 1778, in 2 GENTLEMEN OF THE
GRANDJURY, supra note 7, at 762, 767.
133. Thomas McKean's Address to the Grand Jury of Philadelphia, February 13, 1788, in 2
GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND JURY, supra note 7, at 1098, 1099.
134. See G.S. RoWE, THOMAS MCKEAN: THE SHAPING OF AN AMERICAN REPUBLICANISM 182-84
(1978); Dwight L. Teeter, The Printer and the ChiefJustice: Seditious Libel in 1782-83, 45
JOURNALISM Q. 235, 237 (1968).
135. ROWE, supra note 134, at 184; Teeter, supra note 134, at 237. For an example, see A
Friend to the Army, Letter to the Editor, INDEP. GAZETTEER (Phila.), Oct. 15, 1782, at 2.
136. Teeter, supra note 134, at 237-38.

&

137. Extractsfrom the Diary of Jacob Hiltzheimer, of Philadelphia, 1768-1798, 16 PA. MAG. HIST.
BIOGRAPHY 160, 163 (1892) (entries of Jan. 1 & 3, 1783).
138. Id. (entry of Jan. 4, 1783).

139. My focus is on the grand jury issues raised in the public reaction. For a discussion
focused on the free speech issues arising in the 1783 writings, see Teeter, supra note 134,

at 239.
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"Memorial and Remonstrance" objecting to McKean's treatment, which was
printed in several Philadelphia papers.140 McKean responded in a newspaper
column under the pseudonym "Jurisperitus," in which he directly addressed the
evidentiary standard for an indictment. 141 Invoking Blackstone-while
conspicuously failing to disclose Blackstone's "thoroughly persuaded"

language-McKean argued that it "has been the law for ages" that a grand jury
inquires only into the sufficiency of an accusation. 142 He acknowledged that
"some writers" held a different opinion, but urged that "their opinion has never

been adjudged or received for law."143 McKean's colleague on the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, Justice George Bryan, backed McKean in two columns under

the pseudonym "Adrian." 144 Like the English Tories, he emphasized the greater
importance of the trial over the grand jury. 14 5 Bryan's columns in turn drew a
response from John Witherspoon, the President of the College of New Jersey

(now Princeton).1 46 Witherspoon noted McKean's obvious conflict of interest
in the Oswald matter as a reason why the grand jury might have legitimately

declined to indict. The grand jurors, he reasoned, may have been wary of a
precedent-setting trial "when an exasperated man, of impetuous passions, was
1 47
to preside in the determination of his own cause."

The most detailed treatment of the evidentiary questions arising out of the
incident appears in two essays by Francis Hopkinson, McKean's brother-in-law
and longtime nemesis. 148 Hopkinson, a Philadelphia lawyer and later a federal

140. Memorial and Remonstrance of the Philadelphia Grand Jury, January 6, 1783, in 2
GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND JURY, supra note 7, at 1095, 1095-98. For a list of the
newspapers that printed the Memorial and Remonstrance, see id. at 1098 n.l.
141. Jurisperitus, Letter to the Editor, For the Pennsylvania Gazette, PA. GAZETTE, Jan. 29,
1783, at 1; see also ROWE, supra note 134, at 188 & n.18 (identifying McKean as

Jurisperitus).
142. Jurisperitus, supranote 141.
143. Id.
144. Adrian, Letter to the Editor, FREEMAN'S J. (Phila.), Jan. 29, 1783, at 2 [hereinafter
Adrian II]; Adrian, Letter to the Editor, FREEMAN'S J. (Phila.), Jan. 15, 1783, at 2; see also
Leonard W. Levy, On the Origins of the FreePress Clause, 32 UCLA L. REv. 177, 189(1984)
(identifying George Bryan as Adrian).
145. Adrian II, supranote 144.
146. See Aristides, To Adrian, PA. GAzETTE, Jan. 22, 1783, at 3; see also Teeter, supra note 134,
at 242 (identifying Princeton's President Witherspoon as Aristides).
147. Aristides, supra note 146. For additional reaction to McKean's conduct of the grand
jury, see ROWE, supra note 134, at 187 & n.17, listing other sources who responded in
the local press.
148. One of the People, Letter to the Editor, PA. PACKET, Jan. 25, 1783, at 1, reprinted in 1 THE
MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS AND OCCASIONAL WRITINGS OF FRANCIS HOPKINSON, ESQ. 194
(Philadelphia, T. Dobson 1792) [hereinafter HOPKINSON ESSAYS]; Francis Hopkinson, To
the People, in 1 HOPKINSON ESSAYS, supra, at 219. On McKean's relationship with
Hopkinson, see ROWE, supra note 134, at 49, 188, 235.
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judge, 149 adopted the persona of an ordinary citizen to critique McKean and
Bryan. Hopkinson took aim at Bryan's lament over the grand jury's conduct:
"Was there not, (says [Bryan],) the usual probable evidence for an open enquiry

by a petit jury? If there was, why stifle the cause in the chamber of the grand
inquest?"150 Hopkinson was shocked. "Probable evidence, and stifle a cause," he
exclaimed, was "horrid language!" 15 "[A]re men's lives, reputations, and
fortunes to be hung upon the tenterhooks of logical probabilities," he asked,
"and is the fair acquittal of a fellow-citizen from a heinous charge to be called a
stifled cause?"15 2
McKean is a genuine outlier to the American trend of requiring more than
probable cause to support an indictment. For three reasons, this cuts only

weakly against my claim that the Whig/Wilson view predominated among
Founding-era judges who considered the issue. First (and most speculatively),
McKean's change in tone between 1778 and 1788 suggests that his dispute with
the Oswald grand jury may have driven his position. Second, the strong
reaction against McKean's conduct in the Oswald grand jury proceedings-by
the grand jury itself, Witherspoon, Hopkinson, and others-indicates that
McKean's thinking was out of the mainstream. Third, and most importantly,
McKean's views on the grand jury were not very influential among his
contemporaries. McKean seems to have convinced Judge Richard Peters, a
federal judge in Pennsylvania, who charged a grand jury in 1792 to return an
153
But
indictment on probable cause using logic plainly derived from McKean.
even in Pennsylvania, at least three judges (Addison, Edwards, and Shippen)
gave contrary grand jury charges after 1788.154

4.

Understanding the Founders

A crucial question remains: Why did many American jurists gravitate

towards the Whigs' view and reject the probable cause standard? The political
logic of the Exclusion Crisis, after all, no longer held. Unlike John Somers and
149. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges Hopkinson, Francis, FED. JUD. CTR.,
(last
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetnfo?jid=1093&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na
visited Mar. 3, 2016).
150. One of the People, supra note 148, at 202.
151.

Id.

152. Id. Much of Hopkinson's analysis was drawn from SOMERS, supra note 71, which he
quotes at great length. Id. at 203-16. To preserve his fictional identity, Hopkinson
claimed that the treatise was in "an old folio book" that his grandfather had brought
from England, and of which his father "had made no other use of . .. but to strap his
razor on the leathern cover." Id. at 198.
153. See Richard Peters's Charge, District of Pennsylvania, February 14, 1792, in 2
GENTLEMEN OF THE GRANDJURY, supra note 7, at 1412,1413-14.
154. See Alexander Addison's Charge, supra note 95; Enoch Edwards's Charge, supra
note 105; Edward Shippen's Charge, supra note 98; Edward Shippen's Charge, supra
note 101.
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Henry Care, the American judges did not insist on a strict charging standard in
order to protect their allies from political prosecutions.1 55 We must look
elsewhere for explanation. In two ways, the strict charging standard many
Founding-era judges favored was a good fit with the criminal justice and
political conditions of their time.

First, it makes sense that the Founding generation, with its deep-seated
anxiety about concentrations of power, would share the Whigs' emphasis on
constraining the prosecutorial function.1 56 To the Founders, the "great
problem to be solved" in "design[ing] governance institutions" was the
"excessive concentration of political power."1 57 At least some Founding-era
judges understood the unrestrained power to initiate criminal prosecution as
an example of excessively concentrated political power. Thus Justice Wilson,
in his 1790 grand jury charge, argued that:
The executive power, of prosecuting crimes and offences, might be dangerous and
destructive, if exercised solely by Judges occasionally appointed, or appointed
during pleasure, for that purpose. To prevent this, two precautions are used....
[One] is, that a double barrier-a presentment, as well as a trial by jury-is placed
between the liberty and security of the citizen, and the power and exertions of
1 58
administration.

155. In theory, it is possible that the seditious libel prosecutions of the 1790s could have
impacted the thinking of judges at the very end of what I am calling the Founding
period. See Charles A. Heckman, A Jeffersonian Lawyer and Judge in FederalistConnecticut:
The Career of Pierpont Edwards, 28 CONN. L. REV. 669, 670 (1996) ("Federal prosecutions
for seditious libel had been a matter of great contention during the 1790s, culminating
in the furor over the Sedition Act of 1798."). Yet it seems unlikely that judges
nominated by a Federalist President would have advocated a strict charging standard to
guard against seditious libel prosecutions by Federalist prosecutors.
156. To some degree, the Founding-era judges may have relied on the authority of the
Whigs themselves. The general influence of the Whig movement on American
thinking has been well documented. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 34-36 (1967); FORREST MCDONALD, Novus
ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 77-180 (1985);
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 14-17

(1969). Yet it seems unlikely that American judges adopted the Whig position based
simply on an argument from authority. If they had, one would expect to see copious
references to the principal Whig writers-Somers, Hale, and Hawles-in their charges.
157. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARv. L.
REV. 2311, 2316 (2006) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 308 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). Levinson and Pildes wrote of the Framers of the
Constitution, but anxiety about concentrated power extended throughout the
Founding era. See WOOD, supra note 156, at 150-61 (describing American Revolutionary
thinking about separation of powers); James L. Huffman, Making Environmental
Regulation More Adaptive Through Decentralization:The Case for Subsidiarity, 52 KAN. L.
REV. 1377, 1382 (2004) ("Much in the Constitution of the United States (and in state
constitutions) confirms a commitment to individual liberty and a fear of centralized
and concentrated power.").
158. Wilson's Charge, supranote 27, at 35 (footnote omitted).
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Chief Justice Kinsey of New Jersey made a similar point in rejecting a probable
cause standard:
The truth is, as I believe, this doctrine [of probable cause] has been broached in
times not remarkable for true notions of liberty; Times in which the courts were
filled with judges holding their offices at the will and pleasure of the crown,
which they too often followed with a shameful partiality, as well as an
unrelenting severity against which innocence seldom afforded any security, or by
15 9
which guilt too often escaped with impunity.

The Founding-era judges' embrace of a strict charging standard may be

explained, in part, by their demand for constraints on the delegation of
prosecutorial power.
Second, although Founding-era judges did not say so explicitly, their

insistence that grand jurors be certain of a suspect's guilt may also reflect the
trial system then in place. I have noted that a strict charging standard will be
attractive when an adjudicative system does not otherwise provide adequate
certainty that the people it punishes are guilty.1 60 As Lawrence Friedman
explains, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, trials "rarely lasted a day,
16 1
It would hardly be surprising if
and most were probably much shorter."
of
such trials. They were too politic
the
reliability
judges (privately) questioned
to do so openly, but allusions in grand jury charges to the "risk" of public trial
suggest that part of the impetus for a strict charging standard may have been

162
weakness elsewhere in the adjudicative process.

B.

Probable Cause Triumphant: The Nineteenth and Twentieth

Centuries
Leaving the eighteenth century, the Whig/Wilson view of the criminal
charging standard seems settled. Yet by the middle of the twentieth century, it
had all but disappeared, replaced by the "probable cause" standard so dreaded by
Justice Wilson and many of his contemporaries. This Subpart traces the postFounding history of the criminal charging standard into the twentieth century.

Because the basic story has been told before, 163 my aim is less to describe what
happened than to suggest an explanation as to why.
159. James Kinsey's Charge, Hunterdon County, April 6, 1790, in
GRANDJURY, supra note 7, at 597, 599.

1 GENTLEMEN

OF THE

160. See supra Part I.
161. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 245 (1993).

162. See Enoch Edwards's Charge, supra note 105, at 783; Edward Shippen's Charge,
November, 1800, supra note 101, at 1069. Another possibility bears mention here:
Founding-era judges may have trusted grand juries because grand jurors were selected
from the upper ranks of society. See Washburn, supra note 16, at 2377 ("Early American
grand juries .. . . consisted of educated and propertied white males and they no doubt
represented similarly situated citizens quite well.").
163. See SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 86-113; Kuckes, supra note 10, at 142-47.
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The Whig/Wilson charging standard stood for about the first threequarters of the nineteenth century. 164 If anything, it grew more entrenched.
Treatise writers joined judges in rejecting probable cause as a charging

standard. 165 Judges, meanwhile, made the Founders' approach more
sophisticated by formulating what Barbara Shapiro labels the "prima facie"
standard, pursuant to which a grand jury should indict only if the
government's evidence would, unless contradicted or explained by the
defendant,

warrant

a

conviction. 166

Chief

Justice

Lamuel

Shaw

of

Massachusetts gave an early "prima facie" charge in 1832.167 The evidence
before the grand jury, he explained, "must be of such a nature, that if it stood
alone, uncontradicted and uncontrolled by any defensive matter, it would be
sufficient to justify a conviction on trial." 168 Similar descriptions of the prima
facie standard can be found in nineteenth-century legal opinions,1 69 grand jury
charges,1 70 and a manual for grand jurors in New York. 17 1
164. See SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 93-96.
165. See 1

J.

CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW; COMPRISING THE

PRACTICE, PLEADINGS, AND EVIDENCE `1318 (Philadelphia, Edward Earle 1819); 1 A
COMPLETE PRACTICAL TREATISE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, PLEADING AND EVIDENCE, IN

INDICTABLE CASES 98-1 n.4 (New York, Banks, Gould & Co., 6th ed. 1853) ("Formerly,
indeed, it was laid down that the grand jury ought to find the bill if probable evidence
can be adduced to support it .... But great authorities have taken a more merciful view
of the subject...."). But see FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL PLEADING AND
PRACTICE §§ 361-62, at 249-52 (Philadelphia, Kay & Brother, 8th ed. 1880) (describing the
grand jury's standard as a "question [that] was in former times much considered" and
explaining the positions of Hale, Wilson, McKean, and others).
166. SHAPIRO, supranote 2, at 93-95.
167. ChiefJustice Shaw's Charge to the Grand Jury, AM. JURIST & L. MAG., July & Oct. 1832, at
216, 219.
168. Id.
169. See United States v. Mackenzie, 30 F. Cas. 1160, 1160-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1843) (No. 18,313)
("The same reason should restrain the jury from finding an indictment, unless satisfied
that the facts they present will subject the accused to a legal arraignment and

punishment."); Bostick v. Rutherford, 11 N.C. (4 Hawks) 83, 86-87 (1825) ("So, of an
ignoramus of the bill. It is not evidence as to probable cause. For probable cause will not
warrant the finding of a bill; it requires primafacie evidence of guilt, which is more.").
This is not to say that probable cause for grand juries disappeared entirely. See United

States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1186, 1187 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,321 a) ("The object of the
grand jury is only to judge whether there is probable cause for putting a party to
answer a charge[,] and therefore it should not be bound down to the same strictness of
investigation as the tribunal which is ultimately to decide upon the charge.").
170. In 1836, Chief Justice Roger Taney told a federal grand jury in Maryland that because
"every one is deemed to be innocent, until the contrary appears by sufficient legal
proof," it should return an indictment only when "the evidence before you is sufficient,
in the absence of any other proof, to justify the conviction of the party accused."
Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 998, 999 (Taney, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Md. 1836)

(No. 18,257); see also Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 976, 976 (C.C.D. Conn. 1867)
(No. 18,246) ("In order to find a true bill against any person, the proof should be such as,
in your judgment, would warrant a petit jury in pronouncing the accused guilty.");
Extract from Charges to Grand Jurors: From One of City Judge Russel, July Term 1857,
footnote continued on next page
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Shapiro sees the prima facie standard as a new and distinct approach to
charging, which brought together for the first time an "institutional
element"-the fact that the grand jury heard only the government's evidencewith an "epistemological element"-the idea that the grand jury should be
convinced of the defendant's guilt.1 7 2 Shapiro's view makes sense given her
sources. 173 But it is apparent from the grand jury charges discussed in Part II.A
above that the prima facie standard is continuous with, and even foreshadowed
by, the approach taken by many Founding-era judges. As we have seen,
Founding-era judges justified a strict charging standard in part on the grounds
that the grand jury saw only one side of a case.17 4
The high-water mark for the Whig/Wilson charging standard came in
1872, when Justice Stephen Johnson Field told a federal grand jury in
California that although "[f]ormerly, it was held that an indictment might be
found if evidence were produced sufficient to render the truth of the charge
probable," a "different and a more just and merciful rule now prevails."175 As
such, Field instructed:
To justify the finding of an indictment, you must be convinced, so far as the
evidence before you goes, that the accused is guilty-in other words, you ought
not to find an indictment unless, in your judgment, the evidence before you,
1 76
unexplained and uncontradicted, would warrant a conviction by a petit jury.

Field's charge became the definitive statement of the prima facie standard. 177
Even by 1872, however, the charging standard had begun to shift in the
direction of probable cause. The change came most quickly to information

in A. OAKEY HALL, BRIEF FOR GRAND JURORS IN THE COUNTY OF NEW YORK 15,17 (2d ed.

1864) ("The test ... is this: whether the case for the prosecution is so made out as that, if
sitting as the trying, instead of the indicting body, without any explanation or defence
of any kind from the accused, or anything further appearing, they would feel justified
in rendering a conviction against him.").
171. See A. Oakley Hall, Suggestions and Aids for Grand Jurors, in HALL, supra note 170, at 25
("Some jurors suppose that probable cause or suspicion of guilt is enough to put a man
on trial, and that a petit jury is really to decide. The words, however, of Blackstone are
'THOROUGHLY persuaded of the truth of an indictment."').
172. SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 94.
173. Shapiro's principal sources for Founding-era views include Wilson's charge and
published materials relating to Pennsylvania Chief Justice McKean. Id. at 88-92.
174. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text (noting charges of Francis Dana, Edward
Shippen, and James Iredell).

175. Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 992, 993-94 (Field, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Cal. 1872)
(No. 18,255).
176. Id. at 994.
177. See GEORGE J. EDWARDS, JR., THE GRAND JURY: CONSIDERED FROM AN HISTORICAL,
POLITICAL AND LEGAL STANDPOINT, AND THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING THERETO

105 (1906) ("In the Federal courts the rule there prevailing is thus stated by Mr. Justice
Field .... The same rule is recognized in New York, Massachusetts and Virginia, and
has been adopted in California by statute." (footnotes omitted)).
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charging. Thus far, I have considered only one mechanism for bringing a
criminal charge: the grand jury indictment. Starting with Michigan in 1859,
states began experimenting with charging by prosecutor's information. 178

Nineteenth-century reformers criticized the cost and inefficiency of grand jury
proceedings, as well as their secrecy. 179 Information charging enabled

prosecutors to commence criminal cases without securing an indictment from
a grand jury.1 80 Procedures varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but as a
general rule, when a prosecution was commenced by information, a magistrate
reviewed the sufficiency of the government's allegations at a preliminary

hearing.1 81 In information states, magistrates thus took over the grand jury's
screening function.1 82
Before information charging began, preliminary hearings existed to test
the lawfulness of arrests.1 83 When jurisdictions added the review of
informations to the preliminary hearing's agenda, they had to choose a
standard. They could use the probable cause standard applicable to arrest, or
they could use the prima facie standard, which, at least in the earliest days of
information charging, still dominated the grand jury context. They
overwhelmingly chose probable cause.1 84 In Michigan, for example, an 1862
178. SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:5 (West 2015).

179. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.6(d) (4th ed. West 2015) ("The
dominant arguments advanced in favor of prosecution by information dwelled on the
costs and character of grand jury review."); see also RICHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S
PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1634-1941, at 68-71 (1963) (describing
legislative contests over abolition); David J. Bodenhamer, Criminal Justice and
Democratic Theory in Antebellum America: The Grand Jury Debate in Indiana, 5 J. EARLY
REPUBLIC 481, 488-89 (1985) (noting "three major avenues of attack for anti-jury
delegates" in Indiana: "the grand jury was an antiquated institution in a progressive age;
the secrecy and ex parte proceedings of the body were contrary to republican principles;
and pre-indictment public examinations would be more efficient in prosecuting crime
than continuation of the present system").
180. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 179, § 1.6(d) ("Building upon the expanded authority of the
prosecutor, a movement was initiated in the latter half of the nineteenth century to
allow the initiation of prosecution in felony cases by information rather than
indictment.").
181. Id. ("Where prosecution by information was allowed, it ordinarily had to be supported
by a magistrate's finding of probable cause at a preliminary hearing."); see also SHAPIRO,
supra note 2, at 101.
182. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 161, at 242. In 1884, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of information charging by states. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,
538 (1884) (holding that the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment is not
incorporated against the states).
183. See SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 104-05.
184. Id. at 101 ("Although the evidentiary standard of the judicialized preliminary hearing
varied slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, that institution on the whole adopted a
standard of 'probable cause,' a concept derived from arrest and search and seizure
standards."); see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 179, § 14.3(a) (explaining that the
"dominant formulation" of the standard required for an information is probable cause).
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court ruling held that judges would review informations under the probable
185
cause standard set forth in a statute providing for review of arrests.
Likewise, when the United States Supreme Court approved California's
information charging system in Hurtado v. California, it noted that California
law provided for "examination and commitment by a magistrate, certifying to
the probable guilt of the defendant."1 8 6
Shapiro argues that in the context of information charging, probable cause
emerged as the governing standard "without anyone giving it serious thought
187
simply because it [was] the standard in place for preliminary hearings."
Consistent with Shapiro's explanation, I am aware of no contemporaneous
debate about what charging standard should apply to informations. This

includes the state legislative fights over bills to authorize information
charging.1 88 The proponents of these bills had many complaints about grand
juries and grand jurors-a Michigan legislative committee report, for instance,
contended that "[t]he grand jury is irresponsible as well as absolute in the
exercise of its powers."1 89 Yet the strict charging standard does not seem to
have been among the complaints.1 9 0 The absence of legislative, judicial, or
scholarly attention to the charging standard during the adoption of
information charging is remarkable. To many Founding-era judges, the
charging standard was critically important. But by the middle and latter parts

185. Washburn v. People, 10 Mich. 372, 384-86 (1862). The 1859 Michigan legislation that
authorized information charging was silent about what standard a judicial officer
should use at the preliminary hearing. See An Act to Provide for the Trial of Offences
Upon Information, ch. 138, § 8, 1859 Mich. Pub. Acts 391, 393. The Michigan Supreme
Court later explained that the preliminary examination was designed in part "to
accomplish the purpose of a presentment by the grand jury under the law as it existed
before, in protecting a party against being subject to the indignity of a public trial for
an offense before probable cause had been established against him by evidence under
oath." People v. Annis, 13 Mich. 511, 515 (1865).
186. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 538.
187. SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 105.
188. See sources cited supra note 179.
189. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON
RECOMMENDING THE PASSAGE OF THE BILL TO PROVIDE FOR THE TRIAL OF OFFENCES UPON

INFORMATION, MICH. H.R. Doc. No.4, Biennial Sess., at 20 (1859).
190. Indeed, a Michigan legislative committee seems to have endorsed the prima facie
standard, calling it the "better doctrine" and explaining that it is "doubtless some
security against the too frequent finding of indictments, if the jury will regard it." Id. at
27. The committee did complain that the higher standard "greatly aggravates the injury
resulting to the accused from indictment upon a false and malicious accusation, by
rendering it more weighty." Id. Arguably this is a criticism about the charging standard,
but the committee's concern seems to be more about the institutional setting for the
prima facie finding than the standard itself. See id. ("So far from being a mere
accusation, it is an expression of the deliberate conviction of at least twelve of his fellow
citizens that he is guilty, and that he ought to be put on his trial before the petit jury, to
the end that he may be punished.").
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of the nineteenth century, criminal justice reformers changed it, seemingly
without noticing.

While many states shifted to information charging, the grand jury system
remained in place in the federal courts and other states. Here the changeover to
probable cause was slow and messy. In the late nineteenth century and the first
half of the twentieth century, a mounting number of opinions,191 grand jury
charges,1 92 academic commentaries, 193 and grand jury handbooks1 94
announced that a grand jury needed only probable cause to return an

indictment. By 1932, an article in the Yale Law Journal could maintain that
probable cause was the "catch phrase" for the grand jury's standard.1 95 Even the
191. See, e.g., Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 113 (5th Cir. 1941) ("In the grand jury
room guilt does not have to be shown beyond a reasonable doubt, but only as
probable."), overruled in part by United States v. Cruz, 478 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973);
Atwell v. United States, 162 F. 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1908) (describing the grand jury's "sole
province" as "to make a preliminary and ex parte investigation, to ascertain if probable
cause for presentment be found"); United States v. Potash, 332 F. Supp. 730, 734
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) ("But the grand jury was only required to be satisfied that probable
cause existed to believe the defendants committed the crime charged."); United States v.
Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 299-300 (N.D. Cal. 1952) ("If a grand jury consider competent
and incompetent evidence, they can still indict if the competent evidence is sufficient
to convince them there is probable cause for them to believe, if it were unexplained,
that a crime has been committed."); In re Cravens, 40 F.2d 931, 932 (W.D. Mo. 1929) ("A
showing of probable cause before a grand jury antecedent to indictment must include
competent evidence tending to prove every essential element of the crime charged.");
United States v. Olmstead, 7 F.2d 756, 759 (W.D. Wash. 1925) ("Grand jury proceedings
are not final, and the proof need only establish a reasonable ground to believe that the
defendant is guilty.").
192. See Charge to Grand Jury, 16 F.R.D. 93, 94 (S.D. Cal. 1954) ("Your duty, in all cases, is to
determine whether there is probable cause to believe that an accused person is guilty of
the offense charged."); Charge to the Grand Jury, 1 F.R.D. 144, 148 (D. Kan. 1939) ("It is
not your duty to try the merits of each case, but you are merely to inquire whether
there is sufficient ground to believe that a crime has been committed and whether
there is probable cause to put the accused upon his trial for the commission of such
crime.").
193. George H. Dession, From Indictment to Information-Implicationsof the Shift, 42 YALE L.J.
163, 177 (1932) ("The grand jury stage is, after all, no more than preliminary. The catch
phrase embodying its standard is but probable cause."); Franklin G. Fessenden,
Improvement in Criminal Pleading, 10 HARV. L. REV. 98, 110-11 (1896) ("The great
principle asserted by the Declaration of Rights is that no man shall be put to answer a
criminal charge until the criminal evidence has been laid before a grand jury, and they
have found probable cause, at least, to believe the facts true on which the criminality

depends." (quoting Commonwealth v. Holley, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 458,459 (1855))).
194. See SECTION OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., AM. BAR AsS'N, FEDERAL GRAND JURY HANDBOOK 11

(1958) ("[Y]our investigation must be devoted solely to ascertaining if there is probable
cause to believe that a Federal crime has been committed ...
(emphasis omitted)).
Compare FED. GRAND JURY ASS'N FOR THE S. DIST. OF N.Y., HANDBOOK FOR FEDERAL

GRAND JURORS 16 (2d ed. 1939) (quoting Justice Field's prima facie charge), with FED.
GRAND JURY Ass'N FOR THE S. DIST. OF N.Y., HANDBOOK FOR FEDERAL GRAND JURORS (3d

ed. 1953) (omitting discussion of Justice Field's charge).
195. Dession, supra note 193, at 177.
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Supreme Court mentioned (in dicta) that the grand jury's job is to evaluate
probable cause. 196 But the prima facie standard hung on, finding support in
treatises and grand jury charges as late as the middle of the twentieth
century. 197

Curiously, discussions about the grand jury standard during this period
contain very little direct engagement between the competing options. Writers

who favored the prima facie standard rarely explained why probable cause was
undesirable. For the most part, they did not even acknowledge probable cause's
existence. Nor did probable cause's adherents engage with the logic of the prima
facie standard. The charging standard had apparently fallen off the radar.
In 1978, the Judicial Conference of the United States approved a model
grand jury charge containing the probable cause standard. 198 The conference's
Committee on the Operation of the Jury System issued a report on the model
charge, yet did not pause to note that the probable cause standard was
contestable. 199 The model charge finally settled the issue in the federal courts.
When, in the early twenty-first century, federal defendants mounted a series
of challenges to the model grand jury charge, even they took the basic probable
cause standard as a given. 200 The states, moreover, followed the federal lead: the
vast majority of states that still routinely require grand jury indictments have
adopted probable cause as the charging standard. 20 1 Even when state statutes or
196. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-87 (1972) ("The prevailing constitutional view
of the newsman's privilege is very much rooted in the ancient role of the grand jury
that has the dual function of determining if there is probable cause to believe that a
crime has been committed and of protecting citizens against unfounded criminal
prosecutions."); Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 249 (1932) ("The question whether
there was probable cause for putting the accused on trial was for the grand jury to
determine .... "); Beavers v. Henkel, 194 U.S. 73, 84 (1904) ("The thought is that no one
shall be subjected to the burden and expense of a trial until there has been a prior
inquiry and adjudication by a responsible tribunal that there is probable cause to
believe him guilty.").
197. See THEODORE W. HOUSEL & GUY O. WALSER, DEFENDING AND PROSECUTING FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CASES § 213, at 284 (2d ed. 1946) (arguing for a "beyond a reasonable doubt"
grand jury standard); John Raymond Fletcher, Charge to a GrandJury, 18 F.R.D. 211, 215
(1955) ("The evidence before [the grand jury] is usually only the government's case and
if this will not, although uncontradicted, prove defendant guilty he should not be
indicted at all."); Irving R. Kaufman, The Grand Jury-Its Role and Its Powers, 17 F.R.D.
331, 335 (1955) ("[I]f upon the credible evidence which you have heard, absent an
explanation by the defendant, you would be willing to convict, you should indict.").
198. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
199. See JURY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 34, at 3 (noting that the model charge
"includes instructions on the nature of the grand jury" and "the necessity of probable
cause for indictment").
200. See United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(identifying grounds for challenge to grand jury charge).
201. Many states with information charging occasionally use grand juries. See LAFAvE
ET AL., supra note 179, § 15.1(g). My concern here is only with states that routinely
require indictments. I am aware of two states that still use a charging standard stricter
footnote continued on next page
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constitutions contain language seeming to require the prima facie standard,
state courts have insisted that probable cause suffices for an indictment.202
By the middle of the twentieth century, judges, scholars, and even litigants
had evidently lost interest in an issue that their predecessors in the eighteenth

and early nineteenth centuries cared about deeply. What had happened to
enable this disregard for-and even neglect of-the charging standard? Given
the silence of contemporaries, we are necessarily in the realm of supposition.
One source of explanation lies in broader social and political dynamics
than probable cause. Most significantly, in New York, "[t]he grand jury 'must have
before it evidence legally sufficient to establish a prima facie case, including all the
elements of the crime, and reasonable cause to believe that the accused committed the
offense to be charged."' People v. Vanalst, 959 N.Y.S.2d 356, 357 (App. Div. 2013)
(quoting People v. Wyant, 951 N.Y.S.2d 294, 294 (App. Div. 2012)). Under this standard,
"legally sufficient evidence" means "competent evidence which, if accepted as true,
would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant's commission
thereof." Id. (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 70.10(1) (McKinney 2013)). In New Jersey,
grand jurors are instructed: "You are not to return an indictment unless the State has
presented evidence which together with the reasonable inferences you draw from that
evidence, leads you to conclude that (1) a crime has been committed and (2) the accused
has committed it." Memorandum from Philip S. Carchman, Judge, N.J. Appellate
Division, to Assignment Judges, Directive #12-06: Standard Grand Jury Charge-For
Statewide Use 2 (July 20, 2006), http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/directive/2006/dir_12

_06.pdf.
202. At least three state courts have confronted defense challenges to the probable cause

standard. See Sheldon v. State, 796 P.2d 831, 836 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990); Cummiskey v.
Superior Court, 839 P.2d 1059, 1064 (Cal. 1993) (en banc); State v. Lawler, 267 N.W. 65,
67-69 (Wis. 1936). In Cummiskey, the court considered a California statute providing
that a grand jury should return an indictment only if the evidence "would 'warrant a
conviction by a trial jury."' 839 P.2d at 1063 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.8 (West
1992)). The court concluded that "under the statutory scheme, it is the grand jury's
function to determine whether probable cause exists to accuse a defendant of a
particular crime." Id. at 1064. The logic is hard to find, but the primary rationale seems
to have been that the court had previously assumed a probable cause standard and did
not wish to upset that assumption. See id. at 1064-65. As a spirited partial dissent noted,
"[t]he majority conclude[d]... that the Legislature did not mean what it said." Id. at 1074
(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). Alaska's Court of Appeals made a similar
move in Sheldon. It ruled that the statutory standard for an indictment-evidence that
"would warrant a conviction of the defendant," 796 P.2d at 836 (quoting ALASKA R.
CRIM. P. 6(q))-meant only that the grand jury "should return an indictment when
convinced of the probability of the defendant's guilt." Id. The basis for this imaginative
interpretation was a concern that the grand jury process not turn into a "mini trial." Id.
By comparison, the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in Lawler appears fastidious.
The court gave three reasons for rejecting the defendant's request for a prima facie
standard. First, the court feared that under the prima facie standard, "the investigation
of a grand jury will amount practically to a trial." 267 N.W. at 70. Second, without
citation, the court asserted that "[n]o such degree of proof was required at the common
law to warrant the return of an indictment by a grand jury." Id. (One might reasonably
ask: Whose common law, Pemberton's or Wilson's?) Third, to distinguish Blackstone's
view that an indictment should not rest on "remote probabilities," the court noted that
Wisconsin's definition of probable cause is fairly demanding. Id. at 70-71 (quoting
Beavers v. Henkel, 194 U.S. 73, 84 (1904)).
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affecting the criminal justice system. As probable cause emerged in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, immigration from southern and
eastern Europe increased, 203 African Americans migrated from the South to
northern cities, 204 and an expanding media sensationalized crime.205 I certainly
cannot rule out the possibility that these and other forces impacted how
criminal justice policymakers perceived the charging standard. Yet it seems
strange that the broader social and political dynamics would yield a progovernment reform in this aspect of criminal procedure while, at the same
time, other facets of criminal procedure were transforming in seemingly prodefendant ways, as we will see shortly. 206

We can also seek an explanation in changes within the criminal justice
system itself. The emerging criminal justice system differed from that of the
early nineteenth century in two crucial respects: (i) the formal litigation
process, especially the trial, had grown complicated and seemingly defendantfriendly, and (ii) the institution of plea bargaining had begun its ascent. 207 The
203. Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Borders (En)gendered- Normativities, Latinas, and a

Latcrit Paradigm, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 882, 908 n.64 (1997) ("In the 1880s a new tide of
immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe, namely Italians, Slavs, Poles, Russians,
Hungarians, Greeks, and Jews, broke the Nordic circle of Western and Northern
Europeans, triggering antiforeign sentiments centering on cultural prejudice and
intolerance."); see also WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 15 (2011).
204. Dash T. Douglas, A House Divided The Social and Economic Underdevelopment of America's
Inner Cities, 10 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 369, 371 (1999) ("From 1910 to 1930,
approximately 1.25 million African Americans migrated from the South to northern
cities in search of work."); see also STUNTZ, supra note 203, at 16.
205. HISTORY OF THE MASS MEDIA IN THE UNITED STATES 629 (Margaret A. Blanchard ed.,
1998) ("The New Journalism and the sensational yellow journalism of the 1880s and
1890s, practiced especially by the newspapers of Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph
Hearst, further set the journalistic stage for the tabloids, relying on violence and
human interest stories to help boost circulation into the hundreds of thousands.").
Media sensationalism of crime can be traced earlier, to the "penny press" of the 1830s.
Id.; see also Craig Haney, Media Criminology and the Death Penalty, 58 DEPAUL L. REv. 689,
723 n.173 (2009) ("Criticism of the media's role in promoting and distorting crimerelated issues dates to at least the nineteenth century.").
206. See infra notes 209-16 and accompanying text.
207. Another change internal to the criminal justice system may also be relevant: the
increasing professionalization of police and prosecutors. The first modern municipal
police departments emerged in the United States in the nineteenth century, replacing a
haphazard earlier system of night watchmen and constables. FRIEDMAN, supra note 161,
at 67-68 ("One of the major social inventions of the first half of the nineteenth century
was the creation of police forces: full-time, night-and-day agencies whose job was to
prevent crime, to keep the peace, and to capture criminals."); see also Donald A. Dripps,
The Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights, and the (First) Criminal ProcedureRevolution,
18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 469,475 (2009) ("By 1866 a uniformed police force, counsel
for the defendant, and the penitentiary were common features of American systems
outside the South."); Mark H. Haller, Plea Bargaining: The Nineteenth Century Context, 13
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 273, 274 (1979) (dating the development of the "modern police
department[]" to the 1840s and 1850s in large cities and the 1870s in mid-sized ones). In
footnote continued on next page
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first is naturally related to a relaxed charging standard. I will defer discussion
of plea bargaining to Part III.

As noted above, criminal trials in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century generally took less than a day. 208 "Trials probably got longer and more
complex" over the course of the nineteenth century, though local variations

persisted.209 Enhanced access to counsel is partially responsible, as Nancy King

&

the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, moreover, prosecutors were still
part-timers who spent much of their practice on noncriminal matters. See FRIEDMAN,
supra note 161, at 67 ("In the beginning ... there were no actors in the system who spent
all their working lives in criminal justice."). By the late nineteenth century,
prosecutorial offices in urban centers were staffed by full-time criminal justice
professionals. See Haller, supra, at 274 ("By the 1840s and 1850s in the larger cities and by
the 1870s in middlesized cities, .... full-time prosecutorial staffs developed and often
handled charging decisions, at least in serious cases."). But see MIKE MCCONVILLE
CHESTER L. MIRSKY, JURY TRIALS AND PLEA BARGAINING: A TRUE HISTORY 10 (2005)

(arguing that that early nineteenth-century criminal justice actors were not more
amateurish than their successors).
To be sure, this was not the case everywhere. See FISHER, supra note 12, at 42 ("Like most
public prosecutors in nineteenth-century America, they worked part-time, drew (at
best) part-time salaries, and therefore held more than one job."). In the federal system,
prosecutors became full-time only in the middle of the twentieth century. See Roger A.
Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the CriminalProsecutionFunction to PrivateActors, 43 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 411, 446 (2009). Even in the modern era, many rural prosecutors work parttime. See id. at 419, 421. According to some historical accounts, moreover, it is only in
the late nineteenth century that public prosecutors fully supplanted the earlier system
of private prosecutors. Id. at 422 n.32 ("Although virtually all commentators share the
view that private prosecution was the dominant mode in the colonial era, Joan Jacoby,
in her influential book on the development of the American prosecutor, challenges the
conventional wisdom." (citing JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH
FOR IDENTITY, at xvi-xvii (1980))); see also ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF

CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800-1880, at 119-20 (1989) (documenting the end of
private prosecutions in Philadelphia during the nineteenth century). Yet it is hard to
know in what direction the professionalization of police and prosecutors cuts with
respect to the charging standard. On one hand, judges from the late nineteenth century
forward may have felt less compelled to constrain professionalized police and
prosecutors than they had their (relatively) amateurish predecessors. On the other
hand, the concentration of authority in the hands of powerful prosecutors may have
cut in favor of stricter screening at the charging stage.
208. See supratext accompanying note 161.
209. FRIEDMAN, supra note 161, at 245. Friedman notes that in the 1880s, the average trial in
Alameda County, California was 1.5 days, but that in Leon County, Florida, a court
could handle six trials per day. Id.; see also Malcolm M. Feeley, Plea Bargaining and the
Structure of the Criminal Process, 7 JUST. SYS. J. 338, 348 (1982) (noting that "refinements"
in trial procedure "have made the trial more costly, more time-consuming, and perhaps
more unpredictable"); Nancy J. King, Juror Delinquency in Criminal Trials in America,
1796-1996, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2673, 2710 (1996). Trial length grew dramatically by the
middle of the twentieth century, especially in the aftermath of the "due process
revolution" of the 1960s. See Alschuler, supra note 12, at 38 (reporting that the average
length of a felony jury trial in Los Angeles jumped "from 3.5 days in 1964 to 7.2 days in
1968"). As Benjamin Barton observes, "[i]n a series of famous 1960s cases, the Warren
Court launched a due process revolution in criminal procedure, guaranteeing a series of
footnote continued on next page
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explains: "Expanded provision of counsel for the defense during the nineteenth
centuries meant longer voir dires, more objections, more arguments about
evidentiary and procedural matters, and, of course, more orations to the
jury .... "210 Evidentiary reforms were also significant. 2 11 In the nineteenth
century, restrictions on defendant testimony were lifted, 2 12 while hearsay rules
were liberalized early in the twentieth century. 21 3 Later in the twentieth
century, expert testimony became routine. 2 14 Beyond the trial itself, the
modern criminal appeal emerged in the nineteenth century, 215 and with it, as
Langbein notes, "motions designed to provoke and preserve issues for
appeal."2 16

"In theory," Friedman observes, these reforms were "supposed to be
entirely for the defendant's benefit." 217 Contemporaries saw it that way, which
is not to say that they liked it. Some during the Progressive era complained that
the reforms had turned the criminal process into sport. 218 A writer in 1912
bemoaned that, "[i]n their efforts to protect the innocent from any possible
injustice[,] the law-makers have engrafted upon the old common law
modifications as to its administration that have robbed it mostly of its
deterrent influence." 2 19

new rights to criminal defendants." Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for
Pro Se Court Reform), 62 FLA. L. REV. 1227, 1234 (2010).
210. King, supra note 209, at 2710.
211. See John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining,46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 10-11(1978).
212. Peter W. Tague, The Fifth Amendment: If an Aid to the Guilty Defendant, an Impediment to
the Innocent One, 78 GEo. L.J. 1, 20 (1989) ("Defendants were granted the right to testify
in the latter part of the nineteenth century when jurisdictions decided that it was
wrong to prevent innocent defendants from trying to counter the prosecution's
evidence.").
213. King, supra note 209, at 2711.
214. Id.
215. FRIEDMAN, supra note 161, at 256.
216. Langbein, supra note 211, at 11.
217. FRIEDMAN, supra note 161, at 248 n.*. Friedman was referencing the evidentiary
reforms, id. at 248, but it seems clear that expanded access to counsel and criminal
appeal rights fit his description just as well. For a view contrary to Friedman's, see
Robert N. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense An Emergent ConstitutionalGuarantee in
Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 711, 739 (1976), arguing that many of the evidentiary
reforms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries "had the impact of creating new
obstacles to the presentation of the defense case."
218. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 179, § 1.6(e) ("Some Progressives also complained that the
criminal trial process was being influenced by a sporting theory of justice that
emphasized the competitive contest rather than a search for the truth. This led them to
argue for elimination of defense'advantages' which seemed to them to do no more than
make a game of the trial." (footnote omitted)).
219. ALBERT H. CURRIER, THE PRESENT DAY PROBLEM OF CRIME 23 (1912).
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Regardless of whether Progressives were right that reforms had gone too
far, one thing was clear: the litigation process was guarding against the
conviction of the innocent-or appearing to-like never before. This is
precisely the condition under which we should expect decisionmakers to
deemphasize the charging standard. Charging standards, especially strict ones,
buy certainty that those who are punished are guilty. 220 Judges (and legislators,

to the extent that they took responsibility for charging standards) in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century had every reason to think that
defendants who were punished-despite access to counsel, evidentiary reforms,
and appeals-were, in fact, guilty. 22 1 While their silence precludes any strong
causal claim, it's not surprising that judges and legislators would fail to stress,
and even neglect, the charging standard. The criminal justice system had
provided other means for achieving certainty, or at least it seemed to.
III. Probable Cause and Plea Bargaining
The last Part left off with the probable cause charging standard firmly
ensconced in a criminal justice system with an expansive (and expensive)
criminal trial. But there was-as those familiar with American criminal justice

in operation will recognize-a problem. Even as probable cause rose, criminal
trials in the United States tumbled. 222 Plea bargaining emerged in the United
States in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, but it was not until the
1920s that anyone recognized that it had become pervasive, and not until the
1960s and 1970s that it came under intense scrutiny. By then, plea bargains, not

trials, were the dominant adjudicative method of American criminal justice. As
Robert Scott and William Stuntz memorably put it, plea bargaining "is not
some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system." 223
The logic underlying the probable cause standard-that grand juries and
magistrates need not be certain of a suspect's guilt because trial juries would

be-had been undercut.
This Part explores the intersection of probable cause and plea bargaining.
In Part III.A, I draw on the extensive literature on plea bargaining to briefly
summarize the institution's rise and its consequences for criminal justice. That
literature has amply described plea bargaining's vices and virtues. Less
220. See supra Part I.
221. Moorfield Storey, a former president of the American Bar Association and the first
president of the NAACP, said in 1913 that "[i]t may have been necessary in the days of
Scroggs and Jeffries [the late seventeenth century] to protect the innocent, but to-day
the innocent are in no appreciable danger." Moorfield Storey, Some Practical
Suggestions as to the Reform of Criminal Procedure, Address at the Fifth Yearly
Meeting of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology (Sept. 3, 1913), in
4 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 495, 501 (1913).
222. See infranotes 225-36 and accompanying text.
223. Scott & Stuntz, supranote 21, at 1912.
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understood is that the probable cause standard exacerbates two of plea
bargaining's vices-its "innocence problem" and its lack of constraints on
prosecutors. Part III.B calls attention to these critical but underexplored
interactions between plea bargaining and probable cause.
Plea bargaining diminished the two "goods" in which charging standards
traffic-certainty of guilt and constraint on prosecutors. It would have been
reasonable to expect these changes to lead to a recalibration of the charging
standard. Part III.C offers three explanations for why the probable cause
standard survived in the age of plea bargaining. One possibility is that
decisionmakers' demand for certainty of guilt and/or prosecutorial constraint
diminished. Another is that decisionmakers believed that guilty pleas provided
adequate certainty of defendants' guilt. The final possibility is that, because of
the manner in which the criminal justice system adopted plea bargaining,
decisionmakers never reexamined its fit with probable cause.
A. The Virtues and Vices of Plea Bargaining
Although legal historians have not converged on a theory of why plea
bargaining emerged in the United States, they largely agree about when it
did.224 Rare prior to the Civil War, plea bargaining began its ascent during the

second half of the nineteenth century. 225 Scholars have found documentary
evidence of systematic plea bargaining during the late nineteenth century in

Middlesex County, Massachusetts, 226 New York City, 227 and Alameda County,
224. There are many explanatory theories of plea bargaining. The leading contenders
(several of which are interrelated) are: (i) the length and complexity of criminal trials,
see Alschuler, supra note 12, at 6; Langbein, supra note 211, at 11; (ii) docket pressure, see
FISHER, supra note 12, at 8; (iii) professionalization of police, prosecutors, and the
judiciary, see Malcolm M. Feeley, Legal Complexity and the Transformation of the Criminal
Process The Origins of Plea Bargaining, 31 ISR. L. REV. 183, 207 (1997); see also LAWRENCE
M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, 1870-1910, at 180 (1981); (iv) political economy, see
MCCONVILLE & MIRSKY, supra note 207, at 202; and (v) social control by elites, see MARY
E. VOGEL, COERCION TO COMPROMISE: PLEA BARGAINING, THE COURTS AND THE MAKING

OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY, at viii (2007). For a review of this literature, see Bruce P.
Smith, Plea Bargainingand the Eclipse of the Jury, 1 ANN. REV. L.& Soc. SCI. 131 (2005).
225. See Alschuler, supra note 12, at 18-19; see also Lawrence M. Friedman, Plea Bargainingin
HistoricalPerspective, 13 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 247, 248 (1979) (finding earliest evidence of
plea bargaining in 1860s); Mark H. Haller, Plea Bargaining: The Nineteenth Century
Context, 13 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 273, 273 (1979) ("Albert Alschuler and Lawrence
Friedman . . .. agree that plea bargaining was probably nonexistent before 1800, began
to appear during the early or mid-nineteenth century, and became institutionalized as a
standard feature of American urban criminal courts in the last third of the nineteenth
century."). There are hints of plea bargaining earlier in Anglo-American history, but
not in any systematic form. See Jeff Palmer, Note, Abolishing Plea Bargaining:An End to
the Same Old Song and Dance, 26 AM.J. CRIM. L. 505, 509 (1999).
226. George Fisher, Plea Bargaining'sTriumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 868-76 (2000).
227. MCCONVILLE & MIRSKY, supra note 207, at 288 & fig.12.1.
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California. 228 While prosecutors and defense attorneys in these and other

jurisdictions undoubtedly understood the practice at some level, it flew under
the public radar until the 1920s, when a number of states conducted extensive
surveys of their criminal justice systems. 229 As George Fisher explains, the
authors of the state surveys and a pair of contemporary scholars "quite literally
discovered that plea bargaining had overrun the nation's courts."230
By the middle of the 1920s, guilty pleas, rather than guilty verdicts at trial,

accounted for 70% or more of convictions in more than twenty major
American cities. 231 These high rates, as Alschuler notes, "left little room for
dramatic increases." 232 But rise they did. Alschuler reports that the Federal
Bureau of Census recorded a 77% guilty plea rate (nationally) in 1936, 80% in
1938, and 86% in 1940.233 Federal guilty plea rates dipped somewhat during the
middle decades of the twentieth century, but the overall trajectory of guilty
pleas has been upward. 234 Today, 94% of felony convictions in state court are

the result of guilty pleas; 235 in federal court, the rate is closer to 97%.236
Scholarly attention to plea bargaining has been unrelenting since the
1960s. 237 Much of the debate has focused on plea bargaining's legitimacy, with

228. FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supranote 224, at 174 & tbl.5.12.
229. See FISHER, supranote 12, at 6-7, 6 n.13 (collecting state surveys).
230. Id. at 6; see alsoAlschuler, supra note 12, at 26 ("The dominance of the guilty plea [in the
1920s] apparently came as a remarkable surprise to contemporary observers."). The
early plea bargaining scholars were Justin Miller and Raymond Moley. See Justin
Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1927); Raymond Moley,

The VanishingJury, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 97 (1928).
231. Moley, supra note 230, at 105. Moley identified twenty-one cities with guilty rates of
70% or higher. Of these, ten were between 70% and 79%, six were between 80% and 89%,
and five were 90% or higher. Id. The highest guilty plea rate was 95% in Syracuse and St.
Paul. Moley's table included a few outlier jurisdictions with lower guilty plea rates. The
lowest was San Francisco, at only 33%. Moley was suspicious of this figure. Id. at 105
n.24 ("The record of San Francisco shown in this table is so strikingly out of line with
the tendency in other cities that it deserves more complete investigation than we have
been able to make.").
232. Alschuler, supra note 12, at 33.
233. Id.
234. Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortionand the End of Innocence in FederalCriminalJustice, 154

U. PA. L. REV. 79,91 fig.1 (2005).
235. Anne R. Traum, Using Outcomes to Reframe Guilty Plea Adjudication, 66 FLA. L. REV. 823,

854 (2014).
236. Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendant's Dilemma: An Innovative
EmpiricalStudy of Plea Bargaining'sInnocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 6
n.33 (2013).
237. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Front Page- Notes on the Nature and Significance of Headline
Trials, 55 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1243, 1244 n.2 (2011) ("There is a large literature on plea
bargaining."); Wright & Miller, supra note 24, at 36 ("A huge literature exists on plea
bargaining, much of it produced over the past thirty years.").
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critics calling for it to be abolished. 238 Yet for better or worse, abolition is
politically a nonstarter. 239 Recent scholarship has therefore dropped the all-ornothing quality of the earlier work, 240 and even a leading abolitionist has
announced that "[t]he time for a crusade to prohibit plea bargaining has
passed." 24 1
Like virtually all institutions, plea bargaining has both vices and virtues.
There are two basic social virtues. First, it is a cheap way of disposing of
criminal cases. 242 If plea bargaining disappeared and trials resurfaced as the
ordinary mechanism of criminal adjudication, one of two things would
happen. Either far fewer defendants-including guilty defendants-would be
brought to justice, or else criminal justice expenditures would rise
significantly. 243 Second, plea bargaining enables prosecutors and defendants to
reduce uncertainty by spreading risk.244 This is the central insight of the
"contractual" or "shadow of trial" theory of plea bargaining. 245

238. Zacharias, supra note 15, at 1122-23 ("The academic literature has consisted largely of
attempts to provide a theoretical justification for plea bargaining and, conversely, of
calls for the system's abolition." (footnote omitted)). For examples of calls for abolition,
see Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179
(1975); and Schulhofer, supra note 14.
239. MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND

DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 162 (1978) ("[T]o speak of a plea bargaining-free criminal justice
system is to operate in a land of fantasy.").
240. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463,
2469 (2004) ("At this point, some authors might simply call for the abolition of plea
bargaining, but I take the continued existence of plea bargaining as a given.");
Zacharias, supra note 15, at 1123 ("This Article accepts plea bargaining as a given.").
241. Albert W. Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a Festering Wound, 51

DUQ. L. REV. 673, 706 (2013).
242. See Frank H. Easterbrook, CriminalProcedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289,
309 (1983) ("Yet plea bargaining is desirable, not just defensible, if the system attempts
to maximize deterrence from a given commitment of resources. It serves the priceestablishing function at low cost."); see also DONALD J. NEWMAN, AM. BAR FOUND.,

CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 4 (Frank J.

Remington ed., 1966) ("Compared to the typically long, costly, and complex trial, the
guilty plea is a model of efficiency, assuring conviction of defendants at small cost to all
involved."); Oren Gazal-Ayal, PartialBan on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295,
2309 (2006) ("Plea bargains are not only cheaper than trials, they are much cheaper.");
Wright & Miller, supra note 24, at 38 ("Most discussions of plea bargaining begin with
the observation that plea bargaining makes the prosecutor more administratively
efficient.").
243. See Wright & Miller, supra note 24, at 38. The size of the additional expenditure would
vary depending on what type of trial the post-plea-bargaining system adopted. See
Schulhofer, supra note 14, at 2003-04.
244. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 21, at 1936-40.
245. See Bibas, supra note 240, at 2464 ("The conventional wisdom is that litigants bargain
toward settlement in the shadow of expected trial outcomes.").
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Plea bargaining's defenders also emphasize that plea bargains are in the
private

interest

of both prosecutors

and

defendants. 246

They

enable

prosecutors to preserve pristine win-loss ratios, a valuable consideration in
light of the political ambition of many prosecutors. 247 For defendants, plea
bargaining means avoiding harsh posttrial sentences. 248 In low-level cases
involving detained defendants, the allure of plea bargaining to defendants is
249
especially strong, as it often means winning release for time served.

Plea bargaining also has vices. Many critics have focused on obstacles
preventing litigants from making the rational plea deals that the contractual

model assumes. 250 Stephanos Bibas identifies a large number of such
impediments, including cognitive biases, inadequate funding of indigent
defense, prosecutors' obsession over win-loss records, "lumpy" sentencing
guidelines, pretrial detention, and more.251
Another critique of plea bargaining emphasizes its coercive logic. 252 The
essential mechanism underlying plea bargaining is the trial penalty, i.e., the

"differential between the posttrial sentence and the post-plea sentence." 253
When the trial penalty is sufficiently large, it offers an independent reason for
a defendant to rationally plead guilty, regardless of his guilt or innocence, the
254
Plea
strength of the government's case, or the availability of a legal defense.
bargaining can be described as coercive when the trial penalty is inflated to
induce rational guilty pleas. 255 Critics of plea bargaining argue that this is

exactly what has happened to the trial penalty in the United States. Although
246. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1975
(1992) ("Defendants can use or exchange their rights, whichever makes them better off.
So plea bargaining helps defendants.").
247. Bibas, supra note 240, at 2472 ("Prosecutors are particularly concerned about their
reputations because they are a politically ambitious bunch.").
248. See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1141-42 (2008).
249. See id. at 1143 ("[P]rosecutors make frequent offers of pleas to noncriminal violations
and time-served dispositions."); see also Bibas, supranote 240, at 2491-93.
250. See, e.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Social Psychology, Information Processing, and Plea
Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REv. 163, 165 (2007) ("I take a broader tack to suggest why the
rational actor paradigm in plea bargaining may not capture the reality of the
negotiation between prosecutor and defense counsel, and why lawyers may not be
likely to lessen the effects of cognitive bias and heuristics."); Schulhofer, supra note 14,
at 1987-91 (describing conflicts of interest that pervade plea bargaining).
251. Bibas, supra note 240, at 2468-69.
252. See Langbein, supra note 211, at 13 ("Plea bargaining, like torture, is coercive."). See
generally Conrad G. Brunk, The Problem of Voluntariness and Coercion in the Negotiated
Plea, 13 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 527 (1979) (examining conditions under which plea
bargaining is voluntary or coercive).
253. Wright, supra note 234, at 93.
254. Id.; see also sources cited infra note 259.
255. See Alschuler, supra note 241, at 686; Candace McCoy, Plea Bargaining as Coercion: The
TrialPenalty and Plea Bargaining Reform, 50 CRiM. L.Q. 67, 91-94 (2005).
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the harshest posttrial sentencing laws are directly implicated only in the tiny
percentage of cases that go to trial, their presence is felt in the myriad cases
bargained in their shadow. 256 For plea bargaining's critics, the key point-the
thing that makes plea bargaining coercive instead of just severe-is that the
harshness of posttrial sentences cannot be justified on any grounds other than
that they induce rational guilty pleas. 257 As Bibas notes, an expected posttrial
sentence "is like the sticker price for cars: only an ignorant, ill-advised
consumer would view full price as the norm and anything less as a bargain." 258
The most searing criticisms of plea bargaining focus not on whether plea
deals are in the private interest of litigants-they typically are-but on their
externalities. Two such critiques are critical here because they implicate

certainty of guilt and constraint on prosecution.
The first is plea bargaining's well-known "innocence problem." 259 As
noted, the coercive logic of plea bargaining works on innocent and guilty
defendants alike.260 Even plea bargaining's defenders recognize that it is not an
effective mechanism for sorting the innocent from the guilty. 26 1 While it is
256. See Stuntz, supra note 13, at 2550-53, 2556-57; see also infra notes 266-67 and
accompanying text.
257. See Alschuler, supra note 241, at 686.
258. Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-BargainingMarket: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer
Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1138 (2011); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of
Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1034 (2006) ("[T]hose who do take
their case to trial and lose receive longer sentences than even Congress or the
prosecutor might think appropriate, because the longer sentences exist on the books
largely for bargaining purposes.").
&

259. See, e.g., Russell D. Covey, Signaling and Plea Bargaining'sInnocence Problem, 66 WASH.
LEE L. REV. 73, 74 (2009) ("Plea bargaining has an innocence problem."); Lucian E.
Dervan, BargainedJustice- Plea-Bargaining'sInnocence Problem and the Brady Safety-Valve,
2012 UTAH L. REV. 51, 57 (noting the "significant innocence problem that plea
bargaining has today"); Gregory M. Gilchrist, Plea Bargains, Convictions and Legitimacy,
48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 143, 148 (2011) ("The objections that have been leveled against plea
bargaining are numerous and diverse, but most stem from a common problem: plea
bargaining reduces the ability of the criminal justice system to avoid convicting the
innocent." (footnote omitted)); Wright & Miller, supra note 24, at 94 ("One urgent
problem discussed in the literature on plea bargains (and we believe it is a substantial
problem in fact) is the innocent defendant."). But see Bowers, supra note 248, at 1119
(arguing that the "conventional view" of plea bargaining's innocence problem "is
largely wrong").
260. Ellen S. Podgor, White CollarInnocence Irrelevant in the High Stakes Risk Game, 85 CHI.KENT L. REV. 77, 77-78 (2010) ("[0]ur existing legal system places the risk of going to
trial, and in some cases even being charged with a crime, so high, that innocence and
guilt no longer become the real considerations." (footnote omitted)); see also Bowers,
supra note 248, at 1122-23.
261. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 21, at 1947 ("[S]eparating the innocent from the guilty-the
central task of the system-takes place primarily at two stages: precharging and trial.
Those innocent defendants who are not screened out at the first stage may be forced to
wait for the last; plea bargaining, the intermediate stage, will afford them little relief.").
The reason, according to Scott and Stuntz, is that innocent defendants often have no
footnote continued on next page
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impossible to know the severity of the problem, it is all but certain that
innocent people do plead guilty to crimes, including serious ones. 262 This may
be rational from the defendant's perspective, but it imposes a social cost not
internalized by either litigant. As Stephen Schulhofer explains, "the decision of
an innocent defendant to plead guilty in return for a low sentence inflicts costs
on society, even if the defendant prefers this result, because it undermines the
accuracy of the guilt-determining process and public confidence in the
meaning of criminal conviction." 263

The second externality-centered critique concerns plea bargaining's effect
on the distribution of power among criminal justice actors. Plea bargaining
concentrates power in the hands of prosecutors, at the expense of judges and
juries.264 William Stuntz, who transformed over the course of his career from
one of plea bargaining's most sophisticated defenders to a critic, demonstrated
this powerfully. 265 Stuntz showed that given broad substantive law, severe
posttrial sentences, and prosecutorial freedom to decide what cases to pursue,
plea bargains are driven entirely by the prosecutor's desired sentence. 266
Neither the law nor the strength of the government's evidence has any
marginal effect on the price of a plea.267 John Langbein makes a similar point,
mechanism to credibly signal their innocence. Id. at 1946 ("In the absence of reliable
signals that they can afford to take seriously, prosecutors have no viable option other
than to ignore claims of innocence."). But see Covey, supra note 259, at 76 ("Under
standard assumptions, private information about guilt and innocence is irrelevant to
plea bargaining outcomes. Under other payoff and rule structures, however, private
information can be made relevant through what economists refer to as 'signaling."').
262. See Dervan & Edkins, supra note 236, at 20; see also Bowers, supra note 248, at 1124
("There is no longer any serious question that innocent people are charged with
and convicted of crimes."); Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y.
REv. BooKs (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/nov/20
/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/?pagination=false&printpage=true.
Of the 337
individuals conclusively exonerated through the Innocence Project, 33 pled guilty.
DNA Exonerations Nationwide, INNOCENCE PROJECT (last updated Feb. 19, 2016,
12:34 PM), http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent/improve-the-law/fact
-sheets/dna-exonerations-nationwide.
263. Schulhofer, supra note 14, at 1996; see also NEWMAN, supra note 242, at 3 ("Conviction of
a crime is a serious matter, especially for the person convicted, but also for the entire
social order which defines and supports the conviction process.").
264. Stephanos Bibas, Transparencyand Participationin CriminalProcedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
911, 920-21 (2006) ("One effect of plea bargaining was to reduce juries' roles and to hide
cases from public scrutiny."); Wright & Miller, supra note 24, at 39-40 ("The clearest
effect of plea bargains on trial judges is to marginalize them.").
265. Compare Scott & Stuntz, supra note 21 (making the most sophisticated contractual case
for plea bargaining in the literature), with Stuntz, supra note 13, at 2549 n.4 ("Even so, I
think we [Scott and Stuntz] overemphasized the role trials play-and hence the role

law plays-in plea bargains.").
266. Stuntz, supra note 13, at 2550 ("For [some] crimes, plea bargains take place in the
shadow of prosecutors' preferences, voters' preferences, budget constraints, and other
forces-but not in the shadow of the law.").
267. See id.
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observing that "[a]s a practical matter, plea bargaining concentrates both the
power to adjudicate and the power to sentence in the hands of the
prosecutor." 268 Plea bargaining liberates prosecutors from the constraints of
judges and juries. No individual defendant worries about the effect his plea will
have on the distribution of criminal justice power-nor should he 269-but it is a
consequence nonetheless.
B.

The Interaction of Probable Cause and Plea Bargaining

Plea bargaining's innocence problem and its effect on the allocation of
criminal justice authority have been carefully explored in the literature. Much
less attention has been paid to the interaction of plea bargaining and the
probable cause charging standard. Yet it has profound implications. The
combination exacerbates plea bargaining's vices.
1.

"Zero opinion" mechanism

When two decisionmakers independently form the same opinion, there is
good reason to be confident in the judgment.270 This is the logic underlying the
practice of obtaining second opinions from doctors, lawyers, and others.271 We
can easily imagine a criminal justice system structured as a second-opinion
mechanism. A grand jury or magistrate would give the first opinion, and the
trial jury the second. When both agree that the defendant is guilty, society
would be confident that the person it punishes actually is guilty. Such a
structure would operationalize the Blackstone principle that society should err
on the side of acquitting the guilty rather than convicting the innocent.272
Because plea bargaining circumvents trial juries, it takes one of the
decisionmakers out of the equation. 273 This has the obvious effect of increasing
the other's importance. As Peter Arenella observes, "[i]n a system where the
prosecutor's decision to file charges is usually followed by a negotiated guilty
268. John H. Langbein, On the Myth of Written Constitutions- The Disappearance of Criminal

Jury Trial, 15 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 119, 124 (1992); see also Roza Pati, The ICC and the
Case of Sudan's Omar al Bashir: Is Plea-Bargaininga Valid Option?, 15 U.C. DAvIs J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 265, 323 (2009) ("Those who oppose the powerful plea-bargaining system in
the United States find the power of justice concentrated in the office of the
prosecutor.").
269. Cf. Bowers, supra note 248, at 1163 ("[Tjhe innocent defendant seems a strange agent of
social reform. By obliging her to forego a plea, she is forced to internalize all costs and
risks for diffuse and somewhat abstract public benefit.").
270. See Vermeule, supra note 22, at 1456 ("[A] second opinion may provide extra legitimacy
to the decision or increase the decision maker's confidence that it is correct-at least so
long as the second opinion coincides with the first." (emphasis omitted)).

271. Id. at 1435.
272. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 81, at 1352.
273. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
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plea, we can no longer pretend that the pretrial process does not adjudicate the
defendant's guilt." 274 By itself-i.e., before we focus on probable cause-plea
bargaining is a "one opinion" mechanism. 275

Now consider how probable cause affects this dynamic. Courts and
commentators have long debated the level of proof that probable cause
entails.276 As a matter of federal law, however, the Supreme Court's 2014
decision in Kaley v. United States makes clear that probable cause to indict

requires less than a preponderance of the evidence. Stressing that probable
cause is "not a high bar," the Court expressly equated probable cause to indict
with probable cause to arrest. 277 Probable cause to arrest, in turn, "does not
require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or

even a preponderance standard demands."27 8 While some states use a stricter
formulation of probable cause, many others accord with federal law.27 9 When

a 1981 survey of judges asked respondents to reduce "probable cause" to a
specific probability, moreover, the average was 45.78%.280

In the federal courts and many states, then, grand juries and magistrates
may legitimately find probable cause even if they do not believe that guilt is
more likely than not. This means that the probable cause standard requires no
opinion that the defendant is guilty. Plea bargaining by itself makes the
274. Arenella, supranote 2, at 468-69.
275. By "one opinion" mechanism, I refer to the number of opinions independent of the
prosecutor. A prosecutor who has investigated a case is not a neutral judge of a suspect's
guilt. As Rachel Barkow observes, "[t]he prosecutor who has already invested himself
or herself in a case might reach a biased and erroneous conclusion." Rachel E. Barkow,
Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors Lessons from Administrative Law, 61
STAN. L. REV. 869, 896 (2009). To be sure, there is good reason to think that grand juries
in practice are not themselves independent of prosecutors. See supra note 16. To the
extent this is accurate, grand jury systems are already "zero opinion" mechanisms
before the analysis even gets to the probable cause standard.
276. See, e.g., Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951, 972
(2003) ("We need to step back from the trees and assess the forest: Just how probable is

probable cause?"); William T. Pizzi, The Need to Overrule Mapp v. Ohio, 82 U. COLO. L.
REV. 679, 693 (2011) ("Law professors love to debate even such a basic issue as how
'probable' probable cause needs to be."). The various formulations offered by courts are
typically vague and unhelpful to these debates. See, e.g., Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct.
1090, 1103 (2014) ("Probable cause ... requires only the 'kind of "fair probability" on
which "reasonable and prudent [people,] not legal technicians, act.""' (second alteration
in original) (quoting Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013))).
277. Kaley, 134 S. Ct. at 1103 (referencing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 (1975), to define
probable cause to indict).
278. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 121 (emphasis added).

supra note 179, § 14.3(a) (describing the meaning of "probable cause"
for purposes of preliminary hearings).

279. See LAFAVE ET AL.,

280. Erica Goldberg, Getting Beyond Intuition in the ProbableCause Inquiry, 17 LEWIS & CLAK
L. REV. 789, 801 n.61 (2013) (citing C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof Degrees of Belief,
Quanta of Evidence, or ConstitutionalGuarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1324-25, 1327

(1982)).

559

Probable Cause Revisited
68 STAN. L. REV.511 (2016)

criminal justice system a "one opinion" mechanism because no trial jury ever
adjudicates the defendant's guilt. Adding probable cause to the mix arguably
makes it a "zero opinion" mechanism. Just as there is good reason for
confidence in two opinion system design, there is cause for uncertainty with a
zero opinion procedure.

2.

Prosecutorial incentives

The interaction of probable cause and plea bargaining also affects
prosecutorial control of the criminal justice system.
A sophisticated defense of plea-dominated criminal justice acknowledges
that little sorting of guilty and innocent takes place in formal judicial
proceedings, but posits the prosecutor as a "quasi-judge" or "quasiadministrator" whose screening of cases is the adjudicative system. 281 As

Gerard Lynch observes, "for most defendants the primary adjudication they
receive is, in fact, an administrative decision by a state functionary, the
prosecutor, who acts essentially in an inquisitorial mode." 282 Thus understood,
prosecutors are less litigators than ordinary government bureaucrats, and the
plea-dominated criminal justice system rests, in part, on an implicit trust in
prosecutors to distinguish between innocent and guilty.
Once the bureaucratic logic of plea bargaining has been identified, the tools
of administrative law and political science become useful in analyzing it. As
political scientists and administrative law scholars understand, there are three
basic modes of bureaucratic operation: working, shirking, and sabotage.283
Bureaucrats are "working" when they faithfully serve their principals' policies,
"shirking" when they "fail[] to work," and engaging in "sabotage" when they
substitute their own preferences for their principals'.284 Agents able to "shirk"
or "sabotage" are plainly less constrained than their "working" colleagues.
The danger inherent in an "administrative system" of criminal justice is
that prosecutors will shirk or sabotage instead of work. To the extent Lynch
and others have correctly identified the plea bargaining system as
administrative in nature, they have also identified the possibility for fissures
281. See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of CriminalJustice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
2117, 2149 (1998); see also Wright & Miller, supra note 24, at 111-13 (arguing for the
efficacy of internal controls on prosecutorial screening). I say "plea-dominated criminal
justice" here rather than "plea bargaining" because Lynch expresses discomfort with the
"bargaining" aspect of plea bargaining. Lynch, supra, at 2129-30.
282. Lynch, supra note 281, at 2120.
283. JOHN BREHM & ScoTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING, AND SABOTAGE: BUREAUCRATIC

RESPONSE TO A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC 21 (1997).
284. Sidney Shapiro et al., The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside the Agency
for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 488-89 (2012); see also BREHM & GATES,
supra note 283, at 21 ("Bureaucrats can choose from a variety of policy output decisions,
which we label 'working,"shirking,' and 'sabotage.'").
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between prosecutors and their principals. The trouble is that the probable
cause standard exacerbates that risk by enabling prosecutorial shirking.
Because she must establish only probable cause to initiate a charge, and
because probable cause is typically defined as less than a preponderance of the
evidence, 285 a prosecutor need not investigate a matter sufficiently to convince

herself of a defendant's guilt before obtaining a formal charge, and thus,
usually, a conviction. As a practical matter, this means that the prosecutor is
free to defer to the investigating law enforcement agency rather than make an
independent judgment. That is shirking. The logic of the administrative system
of criminal justice is that the prosecutor will make a reasoned determination of
the defendant's guilt. 286 While many prosecutors discharge this duty vigilantly,
prosecutors occasionally acknowledge bringing charges about which they are
"agnostic."287 Stanley Fisher goes so far as to call it the "prevailing view" in

practice that prosecutors may "proceed absent personal belief in the defendant's
guilt."288 Prosecutors may justify this in multiple ways. One is on the grounds
that the ultimate decision of guilt or innocence-as to particular issues or the
case as a whole-is for the jury, not them. 289 In his classic study of the
prosecutorial role in plea bargaining, Albert Alschuler reported that some
prosecutors he interviewed "insist[ed] that it is not part of their job to make an
independent judgment on questions of intention or questions of
justification." 290 Even when prosecutors are personally convinced that the
defendant is guilty of one offense, moreover, they may tack on additional
charges as to which they are agnostic. 291 The purpose, Alafair Burke observes,
may be to "gain leverage over the defendant in plea negotiations." 292
285. See supra notes 277-80 and accompanying text.
286. Lynch, supra note 281, at 2129; see also Wright & Miller, supra note 24, at 109 (arguing
that as prosecutors attach more care to screening, they should put in place barriers to

bargaining).
287. Alafair S. Burke, ProsecutorialAgnosticism, 8 OHIO ST.J. GRIM. L. 79,79 (2010).
288. Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor:A Conceptual Framework, 15 AM.J.

CRIM. L. 197,230 n.144 (1988).
289. Michael Q. English, Note, A Prosecutor'sUse of Inconsistent Factual Theories of a Crime in
Successive Trials Zealous Advocacy or a Due Process Violation?, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 525,
534 (1999).
290. Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 64

n.42 (1968).
291. Burke, supra note 287, at 86-87.
292. Id. at 87. Many prosecutors do believe that they should prosecute defendants only when
they are personally convinced of guilt. See Alschuler, supra note 290, at 64 n.42 ("In the
reflective atmosphere of a conversational interview, most prosecutors declare that a
prosecutor should not proceed unless he is satisfied of the defendant's guilt."); see also
Burke, supra note 287, at 85 ("I can attest that when I was a prosecutor, I was told, and
'never questioned,' that my colleagues and I should pursue a case only when personally
convinced of the defendant's guilt." (quoting Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor'sDuty
to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 309 (2001))); Gershman, supra, at 309 ("Years ago,
when I became a prosecutor, I was trained to believe that you never put a defendant to
footnote continued on next page
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The prospect of prosecutorial shirking does not exist because of the
probable cause standard. The standard nonetheless exacerbates the risk. By
enabling prosecutors to file charges about which they are agnostic, it further
diminishes constraints on the delegation of prosecutorial authority.
C. Understanding Probable Cause's Survival
At some point, plea bargaining's effects on social certainty of guilt and
constraint on prosecution became obvious to participants in and
commentators on American criminal justice. 293 It is hard to pinpoint exactly
when this happened, but we can place lower and upper bounds. It was probably
not before the 1920s, when plea bargaining was "discovered." 294 Before the
1920s, and in some measure until scholarly attention intensified in the 1960s
and 1970s, plea bargaining was essentially invisible.295 As Lawrence Friedman
observes, plea bargaining in the twentieth century was "[p]ervasive, yes, but for
most of the century, fairly invisible, and certainly not the stuff of controversy;
its rapid rise was hardly noticed by the general public, or even by high courts

trial unless you were personally convinced of his guilt."); John Kaplan, The Prosecutorial
Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U. L. REv. 174, 178 (1965) ("The great majority, if not all,
of the [assistant prosecutors] felt that it was morally wrong to prosecute a man unless
one was personally convinced of his guilt."). But see Alschuler, supra note 290, at 64 n.42
("It may be doubted, moreover, that the prosecutors' declaration[s] always reflect their
actual practices. In the day-to-day game of prosecuting, it seems relatively easy to avoid
serious reflection upon the ultimate question of guilt or innocence."). Prosecutors who
take a more expansive approach to charging violate no ethical rule. Burke, supra note
287, at 83-84. Arguably, so long as probable cause exists, a prosecutor can even charge a
defendant that she personally believes is innocent without fear of professional sanction.
If the prosecutor subjectively believes that the defendant is innocent of the charge, the
problem is arguably one of sabotage, not shirking.
293. To be clear, the consequences of plea bargaining discussed in Part III.A above became
obvious at some point. This is not necessarily true about the interaction between plea
bargaining and probable cause discussed in Part III.B. As noted there, the interaction has
been underexplored in the plea bargaining literature.
294. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. The 1920s round of plea bargaining analysis,
moreover, was fairly limited. See supra notes 226-30 and accompanying text.
295. A 1967 presidential task force noted that plea bargaining "operate[d] in an informal,
invisible manner." PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENF'T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE COURT 9 (1967); see also Walter E. Hoffman, Plea Bargaining and the
Role of the Judge, 53 F.R.D. 499, 504 (1971) ("[P]lea bargaining's prime vice has heretofore
been in its invisibility and lack of candor...."); Moley, supra note 230, at 126 ("Worst of
all, [plea bargaining] carries little public responsibility. It leaves little upon the
record.... The very difficulty with which the facts concerning this practice have been
unearthed show how easy it has been for prosecutors to indulge in this sort of
compromise without exciting public interest."); James Vorenberg, The Presidential
Crime Commission, in Proceedingsof the Thirtieth Annual Judicial Conference, 44 F.R.D. 57,
81 (1967) ("The plea of guilty and the whole issue of the dishonesty of the pleabargaining process in many courts is another area of invisibility, where there is very
little law either in court decisions or in legislation ... [.]").
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and legal scholars."296 Under these circumstances, it would not be surprising if
even those directly involved in criminal litigation failed to appreciate plea
bargaining's systemic effects. If they did, they kept quiet about them. 297

By the 1970s and 1980s, on the other hand, nobody paying attention could
have failed to notice plea bargaining's transformation of the criminal justice
system. By sometime in the mid- to late twentieth century, profound changes
had become apparent. The formalized trial system had given way to plea
bargaining. The new system, whatever its virtues, counted among its vices

both uncertainty about the actual guilt of individuals punished and
unconstrained delegations of prosecutorial authority. Ceteris paribus, these are
precisely the conditions that would suggest a return to a "strict" charging
standard.298 Yet the old standard remained in place. That demands explanation.
In this Subpart, I offer three explanations for probable cause's retention:
changes in the "demand" for certainty and prosecutorial constraint, apparent
changes in the "supply" of certainty, and path dependence.
1.

Demand

The framework in Part I suggests that a strict standard becomes more
likely when criminal justice decisionmakers highly value certainty of guilt and
constraints on the delegation of prosecutorial power. Probable cause may have
been retained in the age of plea bargaining simply because those empowered to
change it did not highly value those goods. This state of affairs is consistent
with the "tough-on-crime movement" that began in the 1960s. 299 A vast
literature considers the causes and consequences of the "punitive turn" in
American criminal justice.300 For present purposes, the crucial point is that

decisionmakers during this period enthusiastically embraced Herbert Packer's
"Crime Control Model" of criminal justice, in which the "repression of
criminal conduct is by far the most important function to be performed by the
criminal process."30 1 It is altogether possible that the emphasis that
decisionmakers put on the "repression of criminal conduct" left comparatively
little room for certainty or prosecutorial constraint.

296. FRIEDMAN, supra note 161, at 392.
297. In his history of plea bargaining, Alschuler notes a handful of commentary from the
1920s and 1930s foreshadowing the subsequent focus on plea bargaining's systemic
consequences, but observes that "[m]ost of the [early] criticism came from the hawks of
the criminal process rather than the doves." Alschuler, supra note 12, at 29-32.
298. See supraPart I.
299. See Darryl K. Brown, CriminalLaw Reform and the Persistence of Strict Liability, 62 DUKE

L.J. 285,288 (2012).
300. STUNTZ, supra note 203, at 252-55. Many of the leading analyses are collected in Brown,
supranote 299, at 288 n.6.
301. HERBERT L.PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 158 (1968).
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2.

Supply

Another explanation for probable cause's retention is based on the
apparent certainty of guilty pleas. In a typical guilty plea, the defendant
solemnly admits in open court that he is guilty of the crime charged, 302 and a
judge finds a "factual basis for the plea."30 3 What more certainty could one
want? This is precisely the logic that the Supreme Court invoked when it
endorsed the constitutionality of plea bargaining in a series of cases in the
1970s. 304 As the Court observed in Menna v. New York, "a counseled plea of
guilty is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and
intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case."305 In
Part I, I suggested that a strict charging standard becomes less likely when
certainty of guilt is otherwise achieved by the adjudicative system. It may be
that probable cause survived in the era of plea bargaining because those
empowered to change it believed (rightly or wrongly) that guilty pleas provide
adequate certainty of guilt.
3.

Path dependence

A third explanation is that criminal justice decisionmakers never
reexamined the fit between probable cause and plea bargaining. Given plea
bargaining's history and its still-ambivalent treatment in formal law, this too is
possible.
As noted, nobody (other than perhaps those directly involved in criminal
litigation) noticed plea bargaining for the first several decades of its rise, much
less its systemic consequences. 306 By the time that plea bargaining's
constitutionality was squarely presented to the Supreme Court in Brady v.
302. Alford pleas, in which the defendant pleads guilty without confessing guilt, are an
uncomfortable exception. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970); Albert W.
Alschuler, Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels The Selective Morality of Professor

Bibas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1412, 1412 (2003) ("Alford pleas are awful. There could hardly
be a clearer violation of due process than sending someone to prison who has neither
been found guilty nor admitted his guilt. If anything short of torture can shock your
conscience, Alford pleas should.").

supra note 179, § 21.4(f) (reciting from Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11(b)(3) and noting the "comparable provision[s]" of many states). But see
Richard L. Lippke, Plea Bargainingin the Shadow of the Constitution, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 709,
720 (2013) ("And though judges are supposed to verify in plea colloquies that a 'factual
basis' exists for any pleas entered, it does not appear that they do so with any rigor.").

303. LAFAVE ET AL.,

304. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) ("Defendants advised by competent
counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards are presumptively capable of
intelligent choice in response to prosecutorial persuasion, and unlikely to be driven to
false self-condemnation."); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) ("That a
guilty plea is a grave and solemn act to be accepted only with care and discernment has
long been recognized.").

305. 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) (per curiam).
306. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
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Hayes,308 the outcome appeared
inevitable. Indeed, there is a sense of fait accompli in the Court's rulings. 310
Left to reconcile the principle that confessions may not be "coerced" with the
underlying logic of plea bargaining, the Court adopted a legal fiction that
United States307

and

Bordenkircher v.

309

prosecutorial threats of severe posttrial sentences are not coercive. 311 But even

the Court seemed less than fully convinced, its ambivalence revealed by a
caveat at the end of Brady: "We would have serious doubts about this case if the
encouragement of guilty pleas by offers of leniency substantially increased the
likelihood that defendants, advised by competent counsel, would falsely
condemn themselves." 312
Even today, the Supreme Court's criminal law jurisprudence often posits
the trial as the basic adjudicative mechanism of criminal justice.3 13 This reflects
the still-ambivalent relationship between plea bargaining and formal law.3 14
307. 397 U.S. 742.
308. 434 U.S. 357.
309. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1037, 1037 (1984)
("In most criminal cases, plea bargaining is necessary and inevitable-at any rate, that is
the view of nearly all knowledgeable scholars and practitioners and much of the public
at large.").
310. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 361-62 ("Whatever might be the situation in an ideal
world, the fact is that the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain
are important components of this country's criminal justice system." (quoting

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977))); Brady, 397 U.S. at 751 ("The issue we deal
with is inherent in the criminal law and its administration .... "(emphasis added)).
311. In Brady, the threatened posttrial sentence was death. 397 U.S. at 743. In Bordenkircher, it
was a life sentence, as opposed to the five years offered in the plea. 434 U.S. at 358-59.
Citing Brady and Bordenkircher, Josh Bowers notes that the Supreme Court "has held
expressly that the kind of mental coercion implicit to a charge-even to a capital
charge or mandatory charge of life without parole-does not qualify as mental
coercion." Josh Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1133, 1147 (2013).
312. 397 U.S. at 758. Lucian Dervan interestingly posits this language as a "safety-valve."
Dervan, supra note 259, at 87-88.
313. There are exceptions, of course. In two recent cases, the Court has given legal
consequence to the defense counsel's role in plea bargaining. See Missouri v. Frye, 132
S. Ct. 1399, 1410-11 (2012) (holding that attorney's performance was deficient when
attorney failed to communicate plea offer to defendant); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct.
1376, 1391 (2012) (allowing ineffective assistance claim when faulty legal advice led
defendant to reject plea offer); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010)
(holding that attorney's performance was deficient when attorney gave incorrect
advice about immigration consequences of plea bargain). Albert Alschuler, however,
argues that Lafler and Frye are not the "landmarks" that they might appear. Alschuler,
supranote 241, at 678-81.
314. See, e.g., Scott W. Howe, The Value of Plea Bargaining, 58 OKLA. L. REv. 599, 630 (2005)
("Current law and practice surrounding plea bargaining reflect ambivalence about this
problem."); Laurie L. Levenson, Peeking Behind the Plea Bargaining Process Missouri v.

Frye & Lafler v. Cooper, 46 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 457, 460 (2013) ("Although plea bargains
are the lifeblood of the American criminal justice system, courts have been ambivalent
toward them.").
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The probable cause standard itself offers an example. Writing for the Court in
2014, Justice Kagan asserted that a grand jury's probable cause finding
"determines only whether adequate grounds exist to proceed to trial and reach"
the question "whether a defendant is guilty beyond peradventure." 3 15 This is, of
course, not entirely correct. As we have seen, in the modern criminal justice
system, the most important characteristic of a probable cause findingwhether by a grand jury or a magistrate-is to commence or advance plea
bargaining, not to invite the defendant to a trial.
There was no moment in time when criminal justice policymakers
"decided" to adopt plea bargaining as the dominant mechanism of criminal
adjudication. American criminal justice backed into plea bargaining slowly and
clumsily. In light of plea bargaining's history and its ambivalent treatment in
formal law, it is entirely plausible that criminal justice policymakers never
examined the fit between plea bargaining and probable cause. If so, probable
cause persisted-and persists today-not because it achieved the "right"
amounts of certainty and constraint, but because it was in the right place at the
right time.

Conclusion
The goals of this Article are largely analytical. I conclude by making the
normative implications of the analysis more explicit.

One potential implication of the historical evidence assembled in Part II is
a legal argument about the "original meaning" of the Grand Jury Clause. One
might, for instance, argue that federal judges may not, consistent with the Fifth
Amendment, instruct grand jurors to indict based on mere "probable cause."
The Supreme Court has proven willing to upset settled criminal justice
practices based on historical evidence. 316 I leave it to those writing on
originalism to develop such an argument in this context. Three limitations,

however, seem significant. First, because the Grand Jury Clause is not
incorporated against the states, the argument would apply only to the federal
criminal justice system. 317 Second, while the probable cause standard is not
ancient, it is, in 2016, settled and supported by precedent. 318 A strong variant of
originalism-akin to what William Baude calls "exclusive originalism"-would
315. Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct.1090, 1104(2014) (emphasis added).
316. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004) (noting that because the text of
the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause did not resolve the question presented,
they had to "therefore turn to the historical background of the Clause to understand its
meaning," and concluding that the history of examination practices "supports two
inferences about the meaning of the Sixth Amendment").
317. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 520, 538 (1884) (holding that the Grand Jury
Clause of the Fifth Amendment is not incorporated against the states).
318. See supra notes 277-78 and accompanying text.
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thus be required to displace it. 319 Third, the history likely cannot support an
argument that the Fifth Amendment requires judges to instruct grand juries

using a prima facie or certainty charge. 320 It is much more plausible (assuming
an originalist methodology) that the Grand Jury Clause precludes charges
based on bare probable cause.
My priority is the criminal justice system of today, which is to say, the
criminal justice system of plea bargains. In Part III.C, I canvassed three plausible
explanations of why probable cause survived when the rise of plea bargaining
might have suggested returning to a stricter standard. My analysis does not
allow me to identify one of the three (or a combination of them) as the "real"
reason for probable cause's stickiness. The critical normative point is this: none
is appealing. Certainty and checks on prosecutorial delegation are vital

elements of a criminal justice system-if we have lost sight of them, that is to
our detriment. Whatever their appearance, moreover, guilty pleas do not

assure us of a defendant's guilt, 321 and we should not have a charging standard
premised on the belief that they do. Finally, there is little good to say about the
accidental retention -of a charging standard designed for an adjudicative regime
we do not use.
The contemporary probable cause standard is problematic at best. In this
moment of criminal justice reform, it should be on the table, and probably on

the chopping block. This could mean changing the standard that judges use
when they instruct grand jurors and that magistrates apply at preliminary
hearings. 322 But innovative institutional mechanisms, calibrated for the
contemporary world of plea bargaining, should also be considered. 323
319. Cf William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 2349, 2355 (2015)
(defining "exclusive originalism").
320. While a "certainty" standard was more popular in the Founding era than "probable
cause," see supra Part II.A, most Founding-era grand jury charges did not take a position
on the probable cause versus certainty debate.
321. See supranotes 259-63 accompanying text.
322. See, e.g., Arenella, supra note 2, at 559 (proposing a heightened grand jury standard).
323. While this is not the place to explore institutional options in depth, I note a promising
one: an exclusionary rule providing that, absent special circumstances, at trial the
government may only offer evidence that it presented to the grand jury or screening
magistrate. Naturally, there would be caveats. For instance, the government should be
allowed to present evidence responsive to the defendant's evidence, or of events
occurring after the indictment or information. The general rule, however, would
incentivize prosecutors to investigate and screen cases before returning indictments
and informations. This would provide both greater certainty of guilt and a meaningful
constraint on prosecutorial authority. And because the government often does not
know before it obtains an indictment or information whether a defendant will accept a
guilty plea, its logic would apply to many cases and not just the few that go to trial. Of
course, the exclusionary rule would have costs, and further analysis is required to
determine whether the benefits would outweigh the costs. Even if they did, the
exclusionary rule would not cure all the pathologies of plea-fueled criminal justice. But
it might push against them. Cf Alschuler, supra note 241, at 707 (arguing that scholars
footnote continued on next page
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Ultimately, the overriding normative implication of this Article is that we
should not take probable cause for granted. As the historical analysis
demonstrates, probable cause is neither necessary nor timeless. Criminal
charging standards represent a choice. It is time-indeed, past time-to revisit
ours.

should "abandon the search for ways to make the criminal justice system fair and
principled" and focus instead on "mak[ing] it less awful").
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